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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF A DIVIDED COURT AND NATION:




Race has been the political issue in this nation since it was
founded And we may regret that that is a political reality, but it
is a reality.'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines af-
firmative action as "actions appropriate to overcome the effects of past or
present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment opportu-
nity."2 Programs enacted under the rubric of "affirmative action" are de-
signed to aid and encourage the hiring of minorities and women in order to
overcome the social and economical disadvantages of these classes because
of past discrimination. Despite this noble mission, American law and soci-
ety have been reluctant to accept affirmative action programs as a proper
remedy for race and gender discrimination. In fact, affirmative action pro-
grams have led to complex mountains of litigation focusing on whether
these anti-discrimination programs are themselves in violation of Titles VI
or VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The
typical reverse discrimination claim is brought by members of the majority,
historically white males and more recently, white females, who argue that
the enacted anti-discrimination program or plan is in fact discriminatory.
These reverse discrimination claims have developed into their own constitu-
tional jurisprudence.
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laude graduate of Loyola University School of Law. She also is a member of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, New Orleans Bar Association, American Bar Association, and Tho-
mas More Inn of Court. Ms. Sanders wishes to thank Lawrence W. Moore, S.J., A.B., M.A.,
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Niro, Chicago, Illinois, for his ideas and healthy debates/discussions on this topic.
1. Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1267, 1268
(1992) (quoting Oral Argument of Solicitor General Robert Bork, United States Jewish Orgs.
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in 92 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
'AJUKU RTOFTHE'JINX ICIJ SAT-A£ 001X ;I1 f A. lA~~ -Q, GerhardX CU~aspert eds., U9)).
2. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (2002).
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An affirmative action program that has been enacted by a private em-
ployer, university, etc. is challenged under Titles VI or VII of the Civil
Rights Act. 3 On the other hand, affirmative action programs enacted by a
state or one acting with state authority are challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause or Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause (which embodies the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause).4 This essay explores seminal United States Supreme Court reverse
discrimination cases. The author then examines the theoretical debates sur-
rounding affirmative action and reverse discrimination claims. Next, the
author discusses the disparity between affirmative action programs based on
gender and those based on race. The author then discusses the treatment of
race in reverse discrimination claims versus racial profiling claims. Finally,
the author examines current issues and case law emerging in this area.
II. SEMINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
CASES THROUGH 1995
This absence of a common ground, this failure to reason together,
causes uncertainty about the future development of the law. 5
By necessity, this section is rather lengthy. However, it is only by
mulling through these cases that the reader gains a greater knowledge of the
conflict within the Court as a whole, but also the conflicting views of the
individual members of the Court. It will also become apparent that the scope
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is just as highly debated today
as it was during its adoption in 1868.
A. Califano v. Webster6  Decided 1977 (Unanimous Decision)
Prior to an amendment in 1972, the Social Security Act computed old
age insurance benefits such that women obtained larger benefits than men of
the same age who had the same earnings record.7 After the amendment, the
3. See generally John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-
Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimina-
tion, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 428-29 (2002) ("[a]s a federal statute, the Civil Rights Act
places restrictions on the behavior of individual members of society and private, non-
governmental entities").
4. See id. ("[a]s a constitutional provision, the Equal protection Clause places restric-
tions on state action").
5. Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1271.
6. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
7. Jd. at 314-16.
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previous distinction between men and women was eliminated for men
reaching the age of sixty-two before 1975 or later.8 An action was brought
to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment. 9 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the statutory
scheme violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.10
A direct appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court" and the
decision was reversed in a per curiam opinion which expressed the views of
Justices Brennan, White, Powell, Stevens, and Marshall.12 Those Justices
reasoned that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which embodies
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee, was not violated
because favorable treatment of women served the permissible purpose of
redressing society's longstanding disparate treatment of women and oper-
ated directly to compensate women for past economic discrimination. 
3
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist
concurred on the ground that the gender classification was rationally justifi-
able on the basis of administrative convenience. 1
4
B. Regents of University of California v. Bakke' 5-Decided 1978 (Plural-
ity Decision)
In Bakke, the application of a white male to a California medical
school was rejected.' 6 That applicant brought this action challenging the
8. Id.
9. ld. at 316.
10. id.
11. Id.
12. Califano, 430 U.S. at 314, 316. Justice Brennan, appointed by President Eisen-
hower, took the Judicial Oath of Office on October 16, 1956. Justice White, appointed by
President Kennedy, took the Judicial Oath of Office on April 16, 1962. Justice Marshall,
appointed by President Johnson, took the Judicial Oath of Office on October 2, 1967. Justice
Powell, appointed by President Nixon, took the Judicial Oath of Office on January 7, 1972.
Justice Stevens, appointed by President Ford, took the Judicial Oath of Office on December
19, 1975.
13. Id. at 317-18. The Justices reasoned that "[t]he statutory scheme involved here ...
was not a result of 'archaic and overbroad generalizations' about women . . . [r]ather, 'the
only discernible purpose of ... more favorable treatment is the permissible one of redressing
our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women."' Id.
14. Id. at 321 (Burger, J., concurring). As a result, every Justice agreed that the affirma-
tive action plan did not violated equal protection. This would be the last time every Justice
agreed whether or not a preference based on race or gender violated equal protection.
Justice Stewart, appointed by President Eisenhower, took Judicial Oath of Office on
October 4, 1958. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Biackmun, and Justice Rehnquist, were ap-
pointed by President Nixon and took Judicial Oath of Office on June 23, 1969, June 9, 1970,
and January 7, 1972, respectively.
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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legality of the school's special admissions program, which reserved sixteen
of the 100 positions for "disadvantaged" minority students.' 7 The school
cross-claimed for a declaratory judgment that its prograrhi was legal.' 8 The
California trial court ruled that the program was illegal, but did not order the
school to admit the applicant.' 9 The Supreme Court of California also ruled
that the program was illegal and also declined to order the applicant be ad-
mitted.20 On certiorari, a divided United States Supreme Court affirmed in
part and reversed in part.2'
Justice Powell, writing the plurality decision, held that while the af-
firmative action program was illegal,22 race may be among one of the many
factors considered by a university or college in passing on applications.2 3
The Court, however, ordered the school to admit the applicant, because the
school failed to show that the applicant would not have been admitted in the
absence of the special admissions program. 4 Justices Brennan, White,
Blackmun, and Marshall, dissenting in part and concurring in part, argued
that Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications employed by a state
or its agencies that violate the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued
that while racial classifications are given strict scrutiny, overcoming sub-
stantial minority underrepresentation in the medical profession is suffi-
ciently important to justify the states' remedial use of race.26 Although Jus-
16. Id. at 276.
17. Id. at 277-79.
18. Id. at 278.
19. Id. at 279.
20. Id. at 280-81. The California Supreme Court transferred the case directly from the
California trial court "'because of the importance of the issues involved."' Id. at 279 (quoting
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976) (affirmed in part,-
reversed in part by Bakke, 438 U.S. 265).
21. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-72.
22. Id. at 271, 305-19. By analogy, Justice Powell compared the University of Califor-
nia admissions process with Harvard University's where "all applicants competed for all
available openings in an upcoming class, but race was used as a positive factor when consid-
ering individual applications." Lindsay C. Patterson, Individual Rights and Group Wrongs:
An Alternative Approach to Affirmative Action, 56 Miss. L.J. 781, 789 (1986). See also
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17, 321-24.
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20. In all, five Justices (Powell, Marshall, Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and White) agreed that "state educational institutions can take race into account in a
properly devised admissions program." Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law,
Policy, and Morality, 22 CoNN. L. REV. 323, 326 (1990). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272,
319-20.
24. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
25, Id. at 328-55 (Brennan, J., White, J., Blackmun, J., Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 357-62. Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall would also reverse
the Supreme Court of California's holding that "the Medical School's special admissions
program [was] unconstitutional . . . as well as that portion of the judgment enjoining the
Medical School from according any consideration to race in the admissions process." ld. at
[Vol. 26
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tice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, dissented, those Justices agreed that the applicant was entitled to
admission.27
C. United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Webe-2 8-Decided 1979 (5-2 Deci-
sion)
In Weber, a master collective bargaining agreement was reached cover-
ing terms and conditions of employment at several plants. 29 The imple-
mented affirmative action plan was designed to "eliminate conspicuous ra-
cial imbalances., 30 A white male worker at one of the plants instituted a
class action lawsuit after he was denied a promotion.31 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that the affirmative
action plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling and held that any employment preferences based upon race, even if
incidental to an affirmative action plan, violated Title VII's prohibition
against racial discrimination in employment.33 The United States Supreme
Court reversed.34
In a decision by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall, White, and Blackmun, the Court ruled that Title VII does not con-
demn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans.35 The
majority Justices reasoned that the plan was permissible under Title VII
because it did not require the discharge of white workers (and their re-
placement with new black hirees), did not create an absolute bar to the ad-
vancement of white employees, and was a temporary measure not intended
to maintain racial balance, but to remedy a preexisting racial imbalance.
36
Justice Blackmun, concurring separately, was of the opinion that the plan
was an affirmative action plan to remedy past violations of Title VII.
37
379.
27. Id. at 421 (Stephens, J., dissenting). "[O]pponents of affirmative action were [thus]
dealt a set-back because the Court recognized that race could operate as a positive factor in
the admissions process." Patterson, supra note 22, at 789.
28. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
29. Id. at 198.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 199. A black co-worker was promoted to the position. Id.
32. id. at 200.
33. Id.
34. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200. Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in the judg-
ment. Id. at 209.
35. Jd. at 208.
36. Id. at 208-09.
37. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented and argued that the
racial quota embodied in the collective bargaining agreement was an
"unlawful employment practice" under the plain language of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d).38 The dissenters reasoned that neither
Title VII's legislative history nor its spirit sanctioned the use of quotas.39
D. Fullilove v. Klutznick4 -Decided 1980 (6-3 Decision)
In Fullilove, associations of construction contractors and subcontrac-
tors brought claims against the Secretary of the United States Department of
Commerce as the administrator of federal programs for local public works
projects and the State and City of New York as actual and potential grantees
of federally funded local public work projects. 4 1 Plaintiffs' Fifth Amend-
ment and Title VI challenges were against a provision of the Public Works
Employment Act, which required at least ten percent of federal funds
granted for local public works projects to be used by state and local grantees
for the procurement of services or supplies from businesses owned and con-
trolled by minorities.42 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the validity of the program.43 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Six members of the Court agreed that the provision of the
Public Works Employment Act containing the set-aside requirement vio-
lated neither the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment nor
Title VI.44 Beyond this holding, however, none of the Justices could agree. 45
Chief Justice Burger, announcing the opinion of the Court and joined
by Justices White and Powell, reasoned that Congress chose a valid means
of achieving its objectives, curbing the effects of prior discrimination,
which impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public con-
traction opportunities, without either violating equal protection or creating
inconsistencies with Title VI. 46 Justice Powell also concurred separately and
38. Id. at 226 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 255.
40. 448 U.S. 448 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
41. Id. at 455. A firm engaged in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work was
also made a party. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 455-56.
44. Id. at 517, 521.
45. Id. at 456-522. Majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Jus-
tices White and Powell, separate concurring opinion by Justice Powell, and concurring opin-
ion by Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackman; Justices Stew-
art, Stevens, and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 456.
46. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 456-92.
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reasoned that the racial classification reflected in the set-aside was not vio-
lative of equal protection because it was a remedy serving the compelling
governmental interest of eradicating the continuing effects of past discrimi-
nation.47 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, who concurred in the
judgment, argued that the appropriate standard of review was intermediate
scrutiny: whether the classification serves an important governmental func-
tion and is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.48 In
dissent, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist argued that on its face, the set aside
49violated equal protection. Justice Stevens also dissented, but argued sepa-
rately that Congress failed to discharge its Fifth Amendment duty to govern
impartially when they failed to establish that the unique statutory preference
established in the ten percent set-aside was justified by a relevant character-
istic shared by members of the preferred class.
50
E. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts5 1-Decided 1984 (5-4 De-
cision)
In Stotts, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee enjoined the City of Memphis from applying its "last hired, first
fired" seniority policy, insofar as it would decrease the percentage of black
employees in any of seven job classifications. 52 The result was that in cer-
tain instances, non-minority employees with more seniority were laid off or
demoted in rank.53 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.54 The United States Supreme Court reversed.55
Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, reasoned that it was not within the dis-
trict court's inherent authority to modify a previously issued consent decree
because a court can award competitive seniority only when the beneficiary
of the award has actually been a victim of illegal discrimination.56 Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented and argued that because the
Court could only review the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion,
57
47. Id. at 515-16.
48. Id. at 519. Thus, a majority of the Court agreed that "a sharing of the burden of
affirmative action by innocent parties was permissible when the remedy was narrowly drawn
to cure the effects of prior discrimination." Patterson, supra note 22, at 790.
49. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 527.
50. Id. at 554.
51. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
52. Id. at 567.
53. Id. at 566-67.
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id. at 574.
56. Id. at 572-83.
57. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 601-21.
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the case was moot and the Court lacked jurisdiction.58 Justice Stevens also
dissented, but reasoned that this case did not involve Title VII.59
F. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education60-Decided 1986 (5-4 Deci-
sion)
In Wygant, a provision was added to the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Jackson Board of Education and its teachers union stating
that if it were to become necessary to lay off teachers, those with the most
seniority would be retained.61 However, at no time would there be a greater
percentage of minority teachers laid off than the percentage of minority
teachers employed at the time of the layoff.62 This provision was designed
to preserve the effects of a hiring policy implemented to increase the per-
centage of minority teachers in the school system. 63 When the Board of
Education adhered to the provision during a lay off, the displaced non-
minority teachers brought this suit and alleged violations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
dismissed the teachers' claims, reasoning that the racial preferences were
permissible as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination by providing
role models for minority school children.65 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.66 On certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, both lower court decisions were reversed.67
While five members of the Court agreed that the layoffs were in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, 68 a majority was again unable to agree
58. Id. at 593-601 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 590-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As a result, many lower courts refuse to read
Stotts as an affirmative action case and regard Justice White's Title VII language as "merely
dicta." See Patterson, supra note 22, at 791. Nevertheless, Stotts illustrates a division be-
tween members of the Court when the result is the loss of benefits to whites as a class. Id.
Moreover,
Stotts... demonstrates the Court's confusion over how to apply group remedies
in a legal culture receptive only to individuals stripped of any historical or group
identity. In this light, the split on the Court, as to the appropriateness of the af-
firmative action remedy, mirrors the ideological split in American society as to
whether justice is a group concept, an individual concept, or both.
Id. See also infra notes 214-42 (discussing group and individual approach to civil rights).
60. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
61. Id. at270.
62. Id. at 270-71.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 271.
65. Id. at 271-73.
66. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
67. Id. at 284.
68. Id. at 269-95.
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upon a reasoning.6 9 Justice Powell announced the opinion of the Court and
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. These Justices
held that strict scrutiny applied to any governmental classification or prefer-
ence based on racial or ethnic criteria 70 and that the need to provide minor-
ity students with role models was not a compelling governmental interest
justifying the use of a racial classification.71 In concurrence, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the layoff provision was not narrowly tailored to
achieve its asserted purpose.7 2 Justice White also concurred, but held that
the layoff policy had the same permissible effect as one that would integrate
a work force by discharging whites and hiring blacks until the latter com-
prised a suitable percentage.73
In dissent, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun argued that the
Constitution was not violated by the school board's attempt to achieve di-
versity, as it was for the benefit of all students.74 Moreover, the dissenting
Justices reasoned that the layoff provision was a permissible means of
achieving this goal because it was a result of the process of collective bar-
gaining. 75 Dissenting separately, Justice Stevens argued that the decision to
include more minority teachers in the school system served the valid public
purpose of seeking multiethnic representation among the faculty, regardless
of whether the board of education was guilty of past racial discrimination.76
69. Id.
70. Id. at 273-74.
71. Id.at274-76.
72. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293-94. Some believe that Justice O'Connor "hoped to avoid
the issue that so bitterly divided the plurality and the dissenters" by offering the alternative
reasoning:
[T]he hiring goal was linked to achieving a parity between the percentage of mi-
nority teachers and the percentage of minority students. But since a disparity in
that regard is no [sic] evidence of discrimination, the hiring goal itself had no re-
lation to the remedying of employment discrimination, and the layoff provision
which was intended to safeguard that hiring goal was likewise unrelated to the
state interest being asserted-thus constituting an impermissible means.
Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or Majority? The Role of Justice
O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L. REV. 47, 60 (1990). Justice
O'Connor was appointed by President Reagan and took the Judicial Oath of Office on Sep-
tember 25, 1981.
73. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 295-312 (Marshall, i., Brennan, J., Bilackmun, J., dissenting).
75. ld. at 307-09.
76. Id. at 313-20.
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G. Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland7 -Decided 1986 (6-3 Decision)
The Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of African-American and
Hispanic-American firefighters, filed a complaint charging the City of
Cleveland with discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in the
hiring, assignment, and promotion of firefighters within the fire department
in violation of Title VII. 78 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio held that there was a historical pattern of racial discrimina-
tion in promotions within the fire department and approved a four year con-
sent decree aimed at remedying the effects of the discrimination. 79 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and reasoned
that the race conscious relief provided in the consent decree was not only
justified by the statistical evidence presented to the district court,80 but that
it was also fair and reasonable to non-minority firefighters.
8'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari.8 2 Justice
Brennan announced the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor.83 This majority held
that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to show that they were victims of racial
discrimination because of the voluntary nature of a consent decree.84 In dis-
sent, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist argued that because the
district court failed to make a finding that plaintiffs were victims of racial
discrimination, they must conclude that the city's failure to promote plain-
tiffs was not on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin as
required by Title VII. 85 Therefore, according to dissenters, the district court
could not order their promotion.86 Justice White also dissented, but argued
that the consent decree was beyond the limits of a permissible remedy be-
cause none of the non-minority employees who were denied a promotion
were shown to have been responsible for the discriminatory practices re-
cited in the decree.87
77. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
78. Id. at 504-05. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of a class of African-Americans and
Hispanic-Americans, and consisting of firefighters already employed by the city, applicants
for employment, and all African- and Hispanic-Americans who will in the future apply for
employment or will be employed as firemen. Id. at 504.
79. Id. at 511-13.
80. Id. at 513. The city also admitted that it engaged in discriminatory practices. See id.
81. Id. at 512.
82. Id. at 515.
83. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 502.
84. Id. at 515-24.
85. Id. at 535-45 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 531-35 (White, J., dissenting).
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H. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v.
EEOCS-Decided 1986 (6-3 Decision)
In Sheet Metal Workers', an action was brought under Title VII to en-
join a union and its apprenticeship committee from engaging in a pattern
and practice of discrimination against black and Hispanic individuals. s9 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
nonwhite workers had been discriminated against and set a twenty-nine
percent nonwhite membership goal to be achieved by a specified date.90 The
District Court's determination of liability and the membership goal was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.9'
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed on certiorari.92
Justice Brennan, announcing the opinion of the Court and joined by
Justices Powell, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, held that Title VII does
not prohibit a court from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative
race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination where a history of
discrimination has been shown or where race-conscious relief is necessary
to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.93 These Jus-
tices were also convinced that the membership goal did not deny benefits to
white persons based on race.94 Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and Justice White, dissenting, argued that the member-
ship goal was a rigid racial quota violating Title VII. 95 Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist dissented and argued that racial preferences that dis-
88. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
89. Id. at 426. The union had already been found guilty of engaging in discriminatory
practices in 1975. Id The district court ordered the union to end such practices and admit a
certain percentage of minorities to union membership by 1981. Id. However, in both 1982
and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying those orders. Id.
90. Id. at 432. This membership goal had been set in the original decree in 1975 and
survived the revision and amendments to the district court's orders. Id.
91. Id. at 433. However, the court of appeals "modified the District Court's order to
permit the use of a white-nonwhite ratio for the apprenticeship program only pending im-
plementation of valid, job related entrances tests." Id On remand, the district court adopted a
revised plan, which gave the union a year to meet the membership goal. Id. In 1983 an
amendment was made to the revised plan. This amendment was challenged on certiorari. Id.
at 437-40.
92. Id. at 440.
93. Id. at 475-79.
94. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 475-79.
95. Id. at 489, 499-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Some
have opinioned that Justice O'Connor's dissent is based on such narrow grounds because a
majority of the Court allowed court-ordered affirmative relief to non-victims. Haggard, supra
note 72, at 62.
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place non-minorities are forbidden except where the minority individuals
were actual victims of the employer's racial discrimination.96
I. California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra
9 7-
Decided 1987 (6-3 Decision)
After pregnancy disability leave, a receptionist at a California savings
and loan was told by her employer that she had been replaced and similar
positions were unavailable. 98 The receptionist filed an action with Califor-
nia's Department of Fair Employment and Housing claiming that the em-
ployer violated a California statute regarding pregnancy leave. 99 The em-
ployer filed an action seeking a declaration that the California statute vio-
lated Title VII because it discriminated against men.'00 The United States
District Court for the Central District of California granted the employer's
motion of summary judgment, holding that the California statute discrimi-
nated against men. 10 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed. 1
02
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Ninth Circuit.'0 3 Justice Marshall, announcing the opinion of the
Court and joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and O'Connor, held that
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not pre-
empt the California statute' °4 because both share the goal of promoting
equal employment opportunities for women'0 5 and neither statute compels
employers to treat pregnant workers better than other disabled employees. 
06
Moreover, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not indicate that employ-
ers are forbidden to extend any benefits to pregnant women that they do not
already provide to other disabled employees. 107
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and in the judgment, argued that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does allow some preferential treatment of
pregnancy as long as it is consistent with the goal of achieving equality of
employment opportunities. 10 Justice Scalia, 0 9 concurring in the judgment,
96. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 500.
97. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).




102. Id. at 280.
103. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280.
104. Id. at 292.
105. Id. at 288-89.
106. Id. at286.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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reasoned that because the California statute did not require or permit any
refusal to accord equal treatment of workers other than pregnant women,
Title VII was inapplicable.1 0 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with
Justices White and Powell, expressed the view that Title VII prohibits pref-
erential treatment of pregnant workers; therefore, according to those Jus-
tices, the California statute is pre-empted because it extends preferential
benefits for pregnancy."'
J. United States v. Paradise' 12-Decided 1987 (5-4 Decision)
In 1972, a class of black plaintiffs filed an action challenging the long-
standing practice of the Alabama Department of Public Safety of excluding
blacks from employment." 3 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama held that the department engaged in a pattern of dis-
crimination and thus ordered the department to hire one black employee per
white employee until blacks constituted approximately twenty-five percent
of the state trooper force. 14 The department was also enjoined from engag-
ing in any discrimination in its employment practices, including promo-
tions.' 15
Twelve years later the District Court found that those same discrimina-
tory policies and practices remained pervasive and conspicuous." 6 Thus, the
court held that for a period of time "at least fifty percent of promotions to
corporal should be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black candidates
were available"; 1 7 that a fifty percent promotional quota in the upper ranks
shall go to blacks if there are qualified black candidates;" 8 and that the de-
partment must submit within thirty days a schedule for the development of
promotion procedures for all ranks above the entry level." 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
"the relief at issue was designed to remedy the present effects of past dis-
crimination" and was deemed to "extend no further than necessary to ac-
109. Justice Scalia, appointed by President Reagan, took the Judicial Oath of Office on
September 26, 1986.
110. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. id. at 304 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was
elevated to the position of Chief Justice by President Reagan and took the Judicial Oath of
Office for this position on September 26, 1986.
112. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
113. Id. at 154.
114. Id. at 154-55.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 162-63.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 163.
119. Id. at 164.
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complish the objective of remedying the egregious and long-standing racial
imbalances in the upper ranks of the department."' 
20
The United States Supreme Court affirmed' 21 in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
2 2
These Justices held that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated be-
cause such relief was narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in remedying the discrimination that permeated entry-
level hiring practices and the promotional process alike. 23 Moreover, the
Justices reasoned that the order did not impose an unacceptable burden on
innocent third parties. 124 The Justices also reasoned that because the district
court had first hand experience with the parties and the particular situation,
its judgment should be respected.125 Justice Powell concurred, expressing
the same views. 12 6 Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but argued that
the guidelines set forth in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion 127 should have guided both the district court and the United States Su-
preme Court's deliberations.1
2 8
In dissent, Justice White argued that the district court "exceeded its eq-
uitable powers in devising a remedy[.],' 129 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Scalia also dissented, but reasoned that the district
court's remedy was not narrowly tailored to accomplish its purposes be-
cause the quotas far exceeded the percentage of blacks in the trooper force
and because there was no evidence in the record that such an extreme quota
was necessary to eradicate the effects of such delay.' 30 These dissenters also
agreed that the rights of non-minority troopers were impermissibly trampled
upon. 131
120. Id. at 165-66.
121. Id. at 166.
122. Id. at 153.
123. Id. at 166-86.
124. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-83.
125. Id. at 183-85.
126. Id. at 186-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. 402 U.S. 1, 20-31 (1971).
128. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 190-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Swann, the Court held
that district courts had broad discretion to fashion remedies that will assure unitary school
systems. Swann, 402 U.S. at 12-13. In exercising that authority, the Court warned that in
devising remedies to eliminate legally imposed segregation, local authorities and district
courts must see to it that future school construction and abandonment are neither used nor
serve to perpetuate or re-establish a dual system. Id. at 20-21. Thus, "[i]n ascertaining the
existence of legally imposed school segregation, the existence of a pattern of school con-
struction and abandonment is thus a factor of great weight." Id. at 21.
129. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 196-201 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
13 I. Id. Thus, Paradise
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K. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Califor-
nia132 - Decided 1987 (6-3 Decision)
The Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County devised an affirma-
tive action plan which, among other things, provided that when making
promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification
where women have been significantly underrepresented, the agency was
authorized to consider, as one of many other factors, the sex of the qualified
applicant. 33 After a female applicant, who ranked third behind two other
male applicants, was selected for a position, one of the higher ranked male
applicants filed suit alleging violations of Title VII. 3 4 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the plaintiff
was more qualified for the position,' 35 that the female's sex was the deter-
mining factor in her selection,' 36 and that the County's plan did not satisfy
the test enumerated in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber137 because
it was not temporary. 38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 1
39
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, Powell, and Stevens. This majority held that the County did not ille-
gally consider the sex of the applicant in making its employment deci-
sion,140 as the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male em-
ployees or create an absolute bar to their advancement.' 4' Moreover, it was
unnecessary for the agency to show past discriminatory practices because
the plan sought to satisfy imbalances in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries and because the plan satisfies the requirements of United Steelworkers
of America. 142 Justice O'Connor concurred. 143 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
foreshadows the continuing debates as to the standard of review to be applied to
affirmative action plans challenged under the Equal Protection Clause and as to
the significance of statistical disparities in employment. However, Paradise also
reflects general agreement among all of the Justices that, in some circumstances,
federal courts may order race-conscious affirmative action where it is necessary
to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1283-84.
132. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
133. Id. at 620-22.
134. Id. at 623-25.
135. Id. at 625.
136. Id.
137. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
138. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625.
139. Id. at 625-26.
140. Id. at 626-40.
141. Id. at 637-40.
142. Id. at 627-37.
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Justices White and Scalia, however, dissented.' 44 They argued that United
Steelworkers of America should be overruled because Title VII makes im-
pennissible intentional race and sex based discrimination, even for purposes
of overcoming effects of societal attitudes that may or may not be reflected
by the employer's employment practices.
45
L. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company146-Decided 1989 (6-3 De-
cision)
In Croson, the city council of Richmond, Virginia adopted an ordi-
nance which required contractors who were awarded city contracts to set
aside at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of contracts to one or more
minority business enterprises that were located anywhere in the United
States, with each such enterprise being at least fifty-one percent owned and
controlled by any United States citizen who was a minority. 147 Suit was
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the set aside violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the plan did not vio-
late Equal Protection. 149 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit initially affirmed the district court, but later reversed and remanded
on grounds that the set-aside requirement was invalid. 50 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.' 5'
In a decision written by Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Stevens, the Court held
that the set-aside requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause because
the city failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in requir-
ing thirty percent of subcontractors to be businesses owned by minorities;
moreover, the city also failed to show that the set aside was not narrowly
tailored, as there was no evidence of past discrimination against the minori-
143. Id. at 642-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-77 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. Thus, "Johnson ... harkens back to Bakke for the idea that race or sex may be a
plus factor." Patterson, supra note 22, at 792 n.62. Nevertheless, with the exception of this
holding, i.e. "that an employer need not have a history of intentional discrimination to ration-
alize its self-imposed affirmative action plan, the Court has for the most part limited the
application of affirmative action to those areas already covered by pre-Stotts case law." Id. at
792.
146. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
147. Id. at477-81.
148. Id. at 483.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 483-86.
151. Id. at 476-77.
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ties benefiting from the set-aside requirement. 52 Justice Scalia, concurring
in the judgment, argued that the only instance where a state might act to
undo effects of past discrimination is where it is shown that the bias is nec-
essary to remedy the effects of past discrimination by the state. 153 These six
Justices agreed that the proper standard to evaluate racial classifications,
even those serving a remedial purpose, is strict scrutiny: whether the classi-
fication serves a compelling governmental function and is necessary and
narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. 154 Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall, and Brennan dissented and argued that the proper standard to evaluate
racial classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment is intermediate scru-
tiny, i.e., whether the remedial goals must "serve an important governmen-
tal objection and be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."155
M. Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio 156-Decided 1989 (5-4 Deci-
sion)
A class of non-white cannery workers brought a Title VII action
against certain cannery companies in Alaska. 157 The workers claimed racial
stratification of the workforce was caused by hiring and promotion prac-
tices, including a rehire preference for minorities, a lack of objective hiring
criteria, a practice of not promoting from within, and separate hiring chan-
nels.' 58 The United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington ruled in favor of the cannery companies. 59 The original three-judge
152. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-508. Justice Kennedy, appointed by President Reagan,
took the Judicial Oath of Office on February 18, 1988.
153. id. at 520-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It has been opined that Justice Scalia believed
"that affirmative discrimination could never be regarded as truly remedial unless it was in
favor of the original victim[.]" Haggard, supra note 72, at 75-76. The majority, however,
"was apparently not yet willing to accept that proposition, and chose instead to resolve the
case on the narrower grounds of the lack of a factual predicate showing specific discrimina-
tion[.]" Id. at 76.
154. JA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-528. Thus, "for the first time [a majority of the Court]
. settled on a single standard-the strict scrutiny test-to determine the constitutionality of
affirmative action [programs] based on race." Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Af-
firmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729,
1731 (1989).
155. J.A. Croson, 480 U.S. at 535 (Blackmun, J., Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
157. ld. at 646-48.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 648. The district court rejected plaintiff's disparate treatment claims and dis-
parate impact challenges. Id.
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panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court af-
firmed; however, the decision was later reversed after an en banc hearing.,
60
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded
in an opinion by Justice White, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.16 1 The majority held that the plain-
tiff bears the burden of isolating and identifying the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical dispari-
ties, and once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie disparate impact case,
the employer bears the burden of producing evidence of a business justifica-
tion for its employment practices. 162 Nevertheless, warned the majority, the
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. 63 Moreover, the majority
held that racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect
to the selection of workers for the employer's other positions.'
64
In dissent, Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall argued
that the intent to discriminate plays no role in a disparate-impact inquiry.
165
The dissenters also argued that once there is sufficient proof of disparate
impact, the employer bears the burden of demonstrating as an affirmative
defense that the challenged practices are necessary to the operation of its
business. 66 Therefore, according to the dissenters, in making out a prima
facie case, employees are not required to "isolat[e] and identifly] the spe-
cific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities."'
' 67
160. Id. at 648-49. The en banc court held that "'once the plaintiff class has shown dispa-
rate impact caused by specific, identifiable employment practices or criteria, the burden
shifts to the employer' . . to 'prov[e the] business necessity' of the challenged practice." Id.
at 648 (quoting Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Nevertheless, the District Court's rejection of the disparate treatment claims was not dis-
turbed by the en banc decision. Id. at 649.
161. Id. at 644-45.
162. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 656-61.
163. Id. Thus, the Court "eviscerated much precedent with no discussion except to pre-
dict that imposing on the employer burdens attending the traditional strong version 'would
result in a host of evils we have identified above."' Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1293. The
problem with shifting this burden is that on the one hand "affirmative action is treated the
same as discrimination against blacks ... [but o]n the other hand,. . . proof of discrimination
and proof of justifications for affirmative action proceed on a very specific level, thus plac-
ing a heavier burden on black plaintiffs and on defendants seeking to support affirmative
action." Id. at 1304.
164. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 656-58.
165. Id. at 661-79 (Stevens, J., Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 667-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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N. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion' 68-Decided 1990 (5-4 Decision)
In Metro Broadcasting, the constitutionality of several of the Federal
Communications Commission's (FCC) practices were challenged under the
Fifth Amendment. 169 These practices included awarding enhancement credit
for ownership and participation by members of minority groups when com-
peting for new radio or television broadcast station licenses, 70 as well as
promoting minority ownership of broadcast stations through a distress sale
policy.' 7' The United States Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Bren-
nan and joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, held
that neither the minority enhancement credit policy nor the distress sale
policy violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.
72
The Court reasoned that the policies, which were mandated by Congress
173
and served the purpose of promoting racial diversity in the broadcast indus-
try, were important governmental objectives within the power of Congress.
Moreover, the policies were substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives. 1
74
Justice O'Conner, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, dissented and argued that the proper standard of re-
view was whether the racial classification was necessary and narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 175 The dissenters were
of the view that the policies in question would not survive strict scrutiny.' 
76
168. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
169. Id. at 552. The disputes in No. 89-453 and No. 89-700 were consolidated. Id. at 552,
558-63.
170. Id. at 556-58.
171. Id. at 557-58. Under this distress sale policy, a licensee whose qualifications to hold
a broadcast license have come into question, may assign its license to an FCC-approved
minority enterprise without the hearing that is ordinarily required before a license may be
assigned. Id. at 557.
172. Id. at 562-69.
173. Id. at 563.
174. Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 569. Instead of attempting to rationalize pol-
icy reasons for adopting this intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court justified the application
of this choice by reference to Fullilove. Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1287.
175. Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "In sum, Metro Broadcasting reveals a funda-
mental difference in how the members of the Court think." Haggard, supra note 72, at 82.
One side "thinks in terms of racial and ethnic groupings, and of insuring that a proportion-
ately equal share of society's goods go to each of these groups." Id. The other side "thinks in
terms of individuals whose identifying characteristics relate to each individual's unique merit
and worth, and of insuring that government does not allocate its benefits on any other basis,
particularly on the basis of race." Id. These "two views sharply divide the court [a]nd the
disagreement will not be resolved through arguments over the proper level of scrutiny, the
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0. Shaw v. Reno177-Decided 1993 (5-4 Decision)
In Shaw, the North Carolina legislature, in an attempt to comply with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, submitted to the Attorney General a revised
reapportionment plan, which included two majority black districts. 78 Five
North Carolina residents filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the State created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.' 79 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal defendants,' 80 that
the defendants failed to state an equal protection claim because favoring
minority voters was not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, 18 1 and
that the reapportionment plan did not lead to proportional under-
representation of white voters statewide. 
82
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, reversed the judgment of the district court. 8 3 The
majority held that plaintiffs stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
by alleging that the reapportionment plan was so irrational on its face, that it
could only be understood as an effort to segregate voters into separate vot-
ing districts because of their race and because the separation lacked suffi-
cient justification.184 Moreover, classifying citizens by race warranted a
different equal protection analysis from cases considering whether multi-
member districts and at-large voting systems violated the Equal Protection
Clause by diluting a minority group's voting strength, because racial classi-
fication threatened special harms that were not present in the vote-dilution
cases. 185 Finally, if the voters' allegation of racial gerrymandering remained
uncontradicted on remand, the district court would be required to determine
distinction between state and federal action, the significance of obscure precedents, or the
existence of necessary factual predicates." Id. at 82-83.
177. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
178. Id. at 633. North Carolina's original reapportionment plan, which contained one
black district, was rejected by then Attorney General Janet Reno because the legislature
could have created a second district with a majority of minority-group voters with lines no
more irregular that those of other districts in the plan, but the state had declined to do so for
pretextual reasons. Id. at 635 (quoting App. To Brief for Federal Appellees 1Oa-I la).
179. Id. at 636-37.
180. Id. at 637.
181. Id. at 638-39.
182. Id.
183. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 632, 636. Justice Thomas, appointed by President Bush, took the
Judicial Oath of Office on October 23, 1991.
184. Id. at 641-42.
185. Id. at 649-50.
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whether the plan was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmen-
tal interest. 186
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented and
argued that in order for plaintiffs' complaint, which claimed the reappor-
tionment plan carved out districts on the basis of race, to state a claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment there had to be an allegation of discriminatory
purpose and effect. 87 Even assuming that the state's admitted intent to im-
prove minority group prospects of electing candidates of their choice consti-
tuted a discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite dis-
criminatory effect, given that under the state's reapportionment plan, whites
still constituted a voting majority in eighty-three percent of the twelve con-
gressional districts.' 88 Thus, according to the dissenters, there was no need
for a remand, even under the Court's approach, because the state's plan was
precisely tailored to meet the Attorney General's objection to the prior
plan. 1
89
Justice Blackmun also argued that because the intent of the redistrict-
ing plan was not to deny a particular group access to the political process or
to minimize the group's voting strength unduly, the conscious use of race in
redistricting failed to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 90 Justice Stevens
argued that the Constitution does not impose a requirement of contiguity or
compactness on how states could draw their electoral districts. 191 Further-
more, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from drawing
district boundaries for the purpose of facilitating the election of a member
of an identifiable group of voters, even when the favored group is defined
by race, and remains underrepresented in the state legislature, therefore
lacking power over the electoral process.'
92
Dissenting separately, Justice Souter argued that there was a general
requirement under Supreme Court cases that in order to obtain relief under
the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to electoral districting, the purpose
and effect of the "districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter
compared to what, as a group member, [the voter] would otherwise be able
to enjoy.' ' 193 Moreover, Justice Souter argued that there was no "need for
further searching scrutiny once it had been shown that a given districting
186. Id. at 653.
187. Id. at 658-60 (White, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 666-67 (White, J., dissenting).
189. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 674-75 (White, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. id. at 676-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 684 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was appointed by President Bush
and took the Judicial Oath of Office on October 9, 1990.
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decision" fell within one of the common categories of dilutive practices.
94
According to Justice Souter, "[t]he Court offer[ed] no adequate justification
for treating the narrow category of bizarrely-shaped-district claims differ-
ently from other districting claims."' 95
P. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 96-Decided 1995 (5-4 Decision)
Adarand involved the federal government's subcontractor compensa-
tion clause, which gave prime contractors financial incentives to hire sub-
contractors certified as small businesses controlled by socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals and required the contractor to presume
that such individuals include minorities or any other individuals found to be
disadvantaged by the Small Business Administration.' 97 Plaintiff, Adarand
Constructors, Inc., who submitted the lowest bid on the subcontract but was
not certified as a small business, filed suit claiming that the race-based pre-
sumptions used in the subcontractor compensation clause violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 98 The
United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds that the case was controlled
by Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, mandating intermediate scrutiny,
rather than J. A. Croson Co., mandating strict scrutiny. 199 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District
Court, agreeing that the appropriate standard of review was intermediate
scrutiny. 0 0
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment
of the Tenth Circuit.20 ' Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, held that for purposes
of determining the validity of all classifications based explicitly on race
imposed by federal, state, or local governments under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and under the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the appropriate standard
of review is strict scrutiny 0 2 Thus, according to the majority, Metro Broad-
194. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
195. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 684 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
197. Id. at 204. While the record did not reveal how the company obtained its certifica-
tion, it could have been by one of three ways: under one of two Small Business Association
programs known as the 8(a) and 8(d) programs or by a state agency under relevant Depart-
ment of Transportation regulations. See id. at 204-08.
198. Id. at 210.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. ld. at 204-05.
202. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 202-03, 227, 235.
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casting was overruled to the extent that it disagreed with the strict scrutiny
standard of review.2 °3 Nevertheless, according to Justice O'Connor, who
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Kennedy,
the government is not disqualified from acting in response to the persistence
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups when race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
interest and is within constitutional constraints, which requires "narrow
tailoring" of any such action.20 4
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and in the judgment, argued that to al-
low the government to discriminate on the basis of race is improper under
the Constitution, as there can never be a creditor or debtor race; thus, ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, it is also improper "[t]o pursue the concept of ra-
11205cial entitlement--even for the most admirable and benign of purposes.
Justice Thomas, also concurring in part and in the judgment, argued that
"there is a moral [and] constitutional equivalence between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in
order to foster some current notion of equality," even though such benefit
programs may have been motivated by good intentions.
206
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer dissented.0 7 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that while a court should be
suspicious of governmental decisions that rely upon racial classifications,
there are significant differences "between a decision by the majority to im-
pose a special burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by
the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority.
20 8
Moreover, there is a difference between a decision by Congress to adopt an
affirmative action program and such a decision by state or local government
to do the same. 2 09 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
argued that there are certain circumstances where the government, consis-
tent with the Constitution, may adopt programs aimed at remedying the
effects of past invidious discrimination. 210 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should not have entertained the question whether any standard below strict
scrutiny should be applied.211 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer,
argued that Congress has the authority to act affirmatively to not only end
203. Id. at 227.
204. Id. at 237.
205. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
206. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citation omitted).
207. Id. at 242, 264, 271 (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer were appointed by President Clinton and took the Judicial Oath of Office on
August 10, 1993 and August 3, 1994, respectively.
208. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 242-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 244-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 270 (Souter, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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racial discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's lingering ef-
fect.212 Moreover, all dissenting Justices agreed that the majority misapplied
the doctrine of stare decisis and thus, Fullilove controlled.
21 3
As demonstrated by the cases, the issue of whether affirmative action
programs are appropriate remedies under Titles VI or VII or the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments is an issue that divides the Court today as much as
it did over twenty-five years ago. Some argue whether the programs should
be enacted at all, other argue to what extent the programs should be al-
lowed. Amidst all of this arguing, there seems to be no room to agree to
disagree.
III. THE DEBATE: REMEDYING PAST DISCRIMINATION OR PUNISHING THE
INNOCENT? ADOPTION OF A GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL APPROACH
Americans rally around the Constitution, while disputing its
meaning, so too with the anti-discrimination principle .... The
stated fear of... [one] wing is that the failure to follow such
measures will revive the effects of Plessey. The stated fear of...
[another] wing is that race-conscious, group based measures will
revive the effects of Plessey.z1 4 [M]aybe all arguments can be un-
derstood only with reference to what they are reacting
against?]215 The search for a common definition of the antidis-
crimination principle must address both these fears.216
The legal and sociological debate surrounding affirmative action cen-
ters around two concepts: affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimi-
nation2 17 and affirmative action as a form of discrimination.
2
18
[D]ecision makers who adopt a [sex blind or] 'colorblind' interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause are likely to do so based on the view that
[sexism and] racism is on the decline in the United States; adjudicators
who adopt constitutional norms more favorable to [gender-conscious or]
212. Id. at 271-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 242-76 (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1335.
215. Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical
Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 317 (1988).
216. Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1335.
217. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 329 (1992); Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and
the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IOWA L. REV. 281 (1987); Brooks, supra note 23;
Freeman, supra note 215; Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986); Patterson, supra note 22.
218. See Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 421,
422 (1990); Haggard, supra note 72.
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color-conscious remedies probably see a far greater degree of [gender
and] racial inequality in American society.
219
This section shall examine both views.
The question of whether a court should adopt an individual or group
approach to rights when examining affirmative action programs and other
remedies to combat racism or sexism, is very much at the heart of the debate
surrounding affirmative action. 220 An individual approach to rights is de-
rived mainly from western "notions of liberty" that describe the relationship
between individuals and the state during the secularization of natural law
jurisprudence in Europe.
22 1
In the natural law tradition, all organized society, including the state,
represents a compact among the people by which the people delegate
some of their sovereign prerogatives and autonomy to the state in ex-
change for the peace, security, and personal well being established by
the organized society. Thus, conceptually, western thought imagines that
the individual antedates the state.
222
As a result, western thinkers recognize only the right of the individual
and sever any group identity of the individual.223
219. Aleinikoff, supra note 217, at 329.
220. In any debate surrounding the adoption of an individual or group approach to rights,
there must be a discussion of whether the rights are to be characterized as negative or posi-
tive. Negative rights are described as reflecting the "natural and inherent traits in human
beings [such that] the state need only recognize ... [its] existence and refrain from interfer-
ing with . . . [it]." Martha Jackman, Constitutional Rhetoric and Social Justice: Reflections
on the Justiciability Debate, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON A
SOCIAL UNION FOR CANADA 17 (Joel Bakan et a]. eds., 1992). Negative rights are favored for
judiciary review because the rights do not require any action on the part-of the government to
act affirmatively; the government need only refrain from intruding on the free exercise of the
right. See id
Positive rights, on the other hand, do "not come into come into existence automati-
cally upon ... recognition. Rather[,] the state must act affirmatively to create . . . [the right]
or to ensure the conditions necessary for ... [its] enjoyment." Id. Because of this, "positive"
rights are "considered highly subjective and imprecise in character" and thus are not justicia-
ble for fear that the "courts will effectively engage in social policy making, a role that is...
reserved for the legislative branches of government." Id.
221. Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 740 (1990). This theory, which has been the "dominant fountainhead of
[western] thinking about rights and the relationship of the individual to the state[,]" was
espoused by Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls. Id. at 740-41.
222. Id. at 740. According to Clinton, this compact explains why "American and western
thought on individual rights . . . [is troubled by] concepts of group, collective, or societal
rights within the context of a larger nation-state." Id. at 742.
223. "American constitutional jurisprudence has largely abstracted the individual from
his or her collective setting." Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between
Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Mi-
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Nonwestem thinkers have a contrary perspective of the nature of rights
and legal relationships. To nonwestern thinkers, people, as social beings,
"never exist isolated from others in some mythic, disorganized state of na-
ture. ' , 224 The individual is "born into a closely linked and integrated network
of family, kinship, social, and political relations... [which becomes] part of
one's personal identity [and these] rights and responsibilities exist only
within the framework of such familial .. .[and] social networks. 225 Thus,
nonwestern thinkers "naturally think of their rights as part of a group. 226
"The justice of any system . .. allocat[ing] rights and resources can be
measured by a variety of yardsticks[;] ...in [predominant western] legal
thought, this yardstick has been the individual. 227 However, the rights of
minorities, women, and other classes of people dealing with the after effects
of discrimination "can be conceived either as individual rights or as collec-
tive [group] rights pertaining to the group as a whole." 228 Nevertheless,
norities, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 249, 254, 259 (1999). For example, consider organ-
ized religious groups and an individual's freedom of religious expression:
While organized religious groups constitute groups that might presumably seek
group protection for the religious autonomy, American law recognizes only the
right of the individual adherent to the free exercise of his or her religion. While
organized churches might sue to vindicate religious autonomy from state regula-
tion, American domestic law only permits an organized church to proceed
through litigation on the theory that it represents religious adherents' individual
rights to the free exercise of religion ...[Thus,] first amendment law in the
United States would require the members of ... [a] church to sue for infringe-
ment of their individual rights of religious observance, or, maybe, first amend-
ment law would permit the Church, to sue as an organized religious association,
to enforce its members individual rights to religious autonomy. In most western
conceptions those rights are held by the individual, not by the religious group
seeking autonomy as a group ....
Clinton, supra note 221, at 741 (emphasis in original).
224. Clinton, supra note 221, at 742.
225. Id.
Such notions of group and communal relationship rights derive from basic prin-
ciples of mutual respect and respectful behavior within and between kinship and
tribal groups. Thus, an individual's right to autonomy is not a right against or-
ganized society .... but a right one has because of one's membership in the fam-
ily, kinship[,] and associational webs of the society.
Id.
226. Id. "Certain rights exist within each social group and other rights and responsibili-
ties are attendant to their relations with members of other groups within the web of associa-
tions that form ... the state. For them, the ... state is merely composed of interlinked group
associations and affiliations." Id.
227. Patterson, supra note 22, at 783.
228. Rosenfeld, supra note 223, at 254 (suggesting a pluralist approach as the remedy for
examining the rights of minorities).
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American law has chosen to recognize only the individual's rights229 and as
might be expected, a tension is created.2
Most proponents of affirmative action favor a group approach to
rights.231 This means that individuals benefiting from an affirmative action
program do not have to show that they were the actual victims of discrimi-
nation by the entity adopting the affirmative action program.
23 2 It is suffi-
229. Id. at 259. "A survey of the constitutional landscape in the United States reveals an
overwhelmingly, if not exclusively liberal, individualistic approach to ... rights [demonstrat-
ing that] American constitutional jurisprudence has largely abstracted the individual from his
or her collective setting." Id. For example, consider the following:
A public declaration falsely accusing an individual of being dishonest is more
injurious, according to... [American constitutional law], than labeling an entire
ethnic or religious group as dishonest. Moreover, the principal reasons for this
discrepancy are that individual slander is usually much more believable than
group slander and that even if it happens to be widely believed, group defama-
tion has a much more diffuse effect on individual members of the defamed group
than individual defamation has on its lone victim.
Id. at 261. Nevertheless, points out Rosenfeld,
[S]ustained group defamation may convince the general population that mem-
bers of the targeted group are likely-and certainly more likely than fellow citi-
zens who do not belong to the group-to be dishonest. This can result in perva-
sive employment, social, and political discrimination against members of the
targeted group, thus producing individual injuries on account of group affilia-
tion.... [Bly abstracting the individual from his or her group in the context of
defamation, American free speech jurisprudence denies individual protection to
certain victims of group defamation who are, for all relevant purposes, equally
situated with others who are accorded such individual protection.
Id. at 261-62.
230. Id. at 254, 260. Rosenfeld demonstrates this tension:
[A] constitutional regime based on individual rights looms as inadequate for
purposes of protecting group autonomy, self-government, and survival; con-
versely, a constitutional regime that relies on group rights appears incapable of
affording sufficient protection to minorities within a minority or to non-
conforming or dissident individuals within the protected group.... [Moreover]
it severely limits individual rights by ignoring individual interests deriving from
group affiliation.
Id.
231. See Patterson, supra note 22. The individualistic approach to group rights isolates
the individual and makes him stand alone by placing "the burden on the victim to realize that
he has a legally compensable grievance, hire and pay an attorney and then proceed the
lengthy and expensive process of a lawsuit." Id. at 785. Patterson finds the
fact that the litigant stands alone flies in the face of any realistic understanding
of the nature of discrimination.. .[for] [i]nsidious discrimination is founded upon
erroneous stereotypes which are used to deny a person a wide range of social
benefits and resources for no other reason than membership in a certain group.
Id. Patterson also believes that a "highly individualized approach to justice also givcs short
shrift to an essential aspect of human beings as social creatures who live in an interdependent




cient to be a member of the discriminated class.233 This approach assumes
that members of the discriminated class, simply by virtue of their member-
ship in that particular class, either already have or will in the future experi-
ence discrimination; thus actual proof of individual discrimination is unnec-
234essary. " According to those proponents, affirmative action programs are
fair and necessary tools for the equality of all individual Americans.
235
Proponents of affirmative action rationalize their claims in a variety of
ways, the most common of which is that non-minorities have benefited from
injustices done to minorities, thus negating any claim of innocence.236
Moreover, these proponents argue that any discrimination suffered by non-
minorities is not intentional, but it is society rationing its limited re-
sources.
237
233. See id. at 796 (commenting that "[ilt is unnecessary in 20th century America to have
individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the
racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, have
managed to escape the impact") (footnote omitted).
234. See Brooks, supra note 23, at 354-57 (noting that "[t]he affirmative action candi-
date is more qualified if he or she has had to overcome psychological and social obstacles
(societal disadvantages) because of race or sex to get to a point of being able to compete with
white male candidates on roughly equal grounds"); Patterson, supra note 22, at 789 (arguing
that "racial discrimination as it exists today is so pervasive that individualistic approaches to
justice are insufficient to correctly respond to the problem").
235. See Brest, supra note 217, at 285 (commenting that "the overall aim of affirmative
action is to address the problem of a perpetual racial [and gender] underclass [and] it is too
early in our history ... to forbid racial [and gender]-based remedies as a matter of constitu-
tional law"); Brooks, supra note 23, at 357 (arguing that "affirmative action reverses institu-
tional and individual discrimination in the selection process ... by mandating a degree of
race- or sex- consciousness that has the effect of canceling out institutional ... and individ-
ual discrimination by placing minorities and females in ... positions ... to cancel out or
counteract such discrimination").
236. See Brooks, supra note 23, at 365 (noting that "white male candidates may not bear
any responsibility for past societal discrimination, but they certainly have benefited from the
effects of such discrimination," for there can be no doubt that "the elimination of minorities
and females as competitors in the past has resulted in a higher proportion of desirable jobs
that are more readily available to white males today [and thus] white males of today enjoy
greater seniority, pension benefits, and experience than minorities or females"); Patterson,
supra note 22, at 798 (commenting that "though white males may not have individually
wronged women and blacks, they have profited by wrongs done to those groups by the com-
munity"). See also Brest, supra note 217, at 283 (suggesting that under one view there is no
cause of action for claims of reverse discrimination by white males because "reverse dis-
crimination was not within the cognizance of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause and therefore
does not state a constitutional claim"); Hasnas, supra note 3, at 434-36 (explaining that
under the Anti-Oppression Principle interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is inac-
curate to describe affirmative action as reverse discrimination because it does not treat indi-
viduals unequally with the intent to oppress).
237. See Kennedy, supra note 217, at 1336 (arguing that the "injury suffered by white
victims of affirmative action does not properly give rise to a constitutional claim, because the
damage does not derive from a scheme animated by racial prejudice;" rather "this diminished
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I Opponents of affirmative action favor an individual approach to
rights.2 38 Thus, the only persons who may benefit from affirmative action
programs are those who are actual victims of that particular defendant's
discriminatory acts. 9 Affirmative action programs benefiting anyone else
are discriminatory against innocent members of society. 240 The stance of
affirmative action opponents is that all racial classifications are unconstitu-
tional violations of the Equal Protection Clause 24' and may even perpetuate
existing stereotypes about women and minorities. 242 These arguments, while
opportunity is simply an incidental consequence of addressing a compelling societal need:
undoing the subjugation of the Negro... [thus] whites are excluded because of a rational
calculation about the socially most beneficial use of limited resources"): see also Brest,
supra note 217, at 283 (noting that "[w]hen a legislature or government agency acts to ad-
vantage a discriminated-against minority at the expense of everyone else, it is not singling
out some other minority group to be dispreferred;" but merely "discriminating against every-
body else in society except for a few particular minority groups"); Brooks, supra note 23, at
362 (suggesting that "affirmative action is not unfair to a rejected white male because, in
reality, it merely places him on roughly equal footing with competing minorities and fe-
males").
238. See Haggard, supra note 72, at 84-85 (advocating "victim-specific relief' and argu-
ing that "an affirmative action actor is privileged to 'remedy' only the prior discrimination of
that actor, or someone for whom the actor is responsible, but not the prior discrimination for
society as a whole;" the "notion of non-victim specific 'remedial' affirmative action makes
sense only if you assume that the original wrong was against 'the group' and that the later
remedy is for 'the group's' benefit"); but see Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1305 (stating that
"discrimination is group based, yet it falls on individuals").
239. See Feagins, supra note 218, at 451 (referring to a group approach as a "misguided
polic[y] of group entitlements"); Haggard, supra note 72, at 85 (arguing that "[t]he benefici-
aries of affirmative action, or the defendant employer on their behalf, should be required to
make some showing that they were likely or probable victims of the prior discrimination, as
evidenced by the statistics"). This view is quite opposite from proponents of affirmative
action, who favor a presumption that racial minorities and females have already been dis-
criminated against by virtue of the fact that they are members of a class or group that has
been historically discriminated against. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
240. See Feagins, supra note 218, at 441, 448 (referring to affirmative action policies as
sanctioning "the race- and sex-based policy of robbing Peter to pay Paul (and Paula)" and
embodying "the notion of preferential treatment of minorities and women as groups, rather
than equal opportunity for all individuals").
241. See id. at 422 ("discrimination on the basis of race or sex is unconstitutional because
it violates the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment ... [and] 'af-
firmative action' is the 'samesin'-the continuation an propagation of 'separate but equal'
race- and sex-consciousness").
242. See id at 449 (rejecting the "presumption that every minority or woman is disadvan-
taged due to 'societal discrimination' and arguing that "[i]n our society ... minorities, like
white males, occupy a wide-range of socio-economic levels"); Haggard, supra note 72, at 52
(arguing that "preferential treatment continues rather than cures the problems of discrimina-
tion, in that it re-in..rccs the false but stereotypical notion that wonen, Blacks, and other
minorities, being innately inferior, cannot obtain positions of importance in any other way").




persuasive, fail to recognize the disparate treatment of racial classifications
in criminal law or the disparate treatment of racial classifications as opposed
to gender classifications, as discussed below.
IV. DISPARITY OF TREATMENT OF GENDER AND RACE IN REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
It is interesting to note that the debate over gender preferences
appears to have dissipated over time, while the intensity of the
discussion regarding racial preferences has escalated
2 43
The state of constitutional law in all discrimination claims reveals a
disparity in the treatment of race and gender.244 Racial classifications are
considered "suspect" and thus, subjected to a higher level of scrutiny-
namely strict scrutiny. 245 Gender classifications, while "suspect," are not
subjected to "strict scrutiny," but rather, an intermediate scrutiny level of
review. 246 Thus, courts will subject classifications based on race to a higher
level of scrutiny than classifications based on gender, and this difference
results in greater protection for affirmative action programs making classifi-
cations based on gender than for affirmative action programs making classi-
fications based on race.247
Gender classifications aimed at remedying the effects of past discrimi-
nation against women, and arguably those that also create greater gender
diversity, can withstand constitutional challenges under the Fifth and Four-
243. Constance Hawke, Refraining the Rationale for Affirmative Action in Higher Educa-
tion Admissions, 135 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (1999).
244. This article only analyzes three cases challenging an affirmative action program for
women; the first was challenged on constitutional grounds, the other two were challenged on
Title VII grounds. See generally Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social security
scheme passes constitutional muster); Cal. Sav. & Loans Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987) (no violation of Title VII); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616 (1987) (no Title VII violation).
245. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirmative action
programs benefiting minorities subject to strict scrutiny). See also Brooks, supra note 23, at
342-45 (discussing standard of scrutiny for classifications based on race in reverse discrimi-
nation claims).
246. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 316-17 (affirmative action programs benefiting women
subject to intermediate scrutiny). See also Brooks, supra note 23, at 345-48 (discussing
standard of scrutiny for classifications based on gender in reverse discrimination claims).
247. This appears to make sense for under current constitutional jurisprudence, classifica-
tions based on gender must serve an important governmental interest and the means used
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives; on the other hand classi-
fications based on race must serve a compelling governmental interest and the means used
must be necessary to the achievement of those objectives. See Brooks, supra note 23, at 342-
48 (comparing standards of proof needed for affirmative action programs benefiting women
and those benefiting minorities).
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teenth Amendments.2 48 Yet the same programs creating a racial classifica-
tion may not.249 Such an inequitable result surely was not the framers intent,
especially as the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to pro-
hibit race discrimination.250 To solve this disparity, if it should even be
solved, the same standard of scrutiny should apply to discrimination chal-
lenges based on race and sex.
251
248 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-31 (1982) (discussing
possibility that the state's scheme may have passed constitutional muster if the state showed
past discrimination against women in that particular field); Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (social
security scheme not violation of equal protection because it seeks to remedy past effects of
discrimination against women). See also Brooks, supra note 23, at 348 (comparing disparity
in reverse discrimination claims based on sex and race and noting that "a gender-based clas-
sification designed to redress societal discrimination would pass muster under the important
governmental ends test").
249. See JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 511 (affirmative action program seeking to remedy
effects of past discrimination against minorities insufficient to past constitutional muster).
See also Brooks, supra note 23, at 344 (discussing Croson and noting that "the desire to
redress the present effects of past societal discrimination can never be a compelling govern-
mental reason for racial discrimination").
250. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-08 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v.
Louisiana, 492 U.S. 522 (1975) (the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause was
designed to prohibit legal burdens based on race).
Future affirmative action cases will ... have to grapple with a... serious prob-
lem of constitutional interpretation created by... Supreme Court affirmative ac-
tion opinions .. .[t]o the extent that gender-based affirmative action programs
are easier to defend than race-based affirmative action programs under the equal
protection clause ... [which is] a bizarre state of affairs. . . [because] [females
and minorities will receive unequal treatment under the equal protection clause,
with females enjoying better treatment than ... [minorities], the intended pri-
mary beneficiary group of the equal protection clause).
Brooks, supra note 23, at 350. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (classifications discriminating against minorities based on race receive strict scru-
tiny), with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (classifications discriminating against
women based on gender receive intermediate scrutiny).
251. This would mean examining racial classifications under intermediate scrutiny or
examining gender classifications under strict scrutiny. See Brooks, supra note 23, at 350
(arguing that "[m]crging constitutional . .. standards into a single standaid of pernissiulllt y
that would govern all ... affirmative action programs is one sure way to resolve the parity




V. DISPARITY OF TREATMENT OF RACE IN REVERSE DISCRIMINATING
CLAIMS AND RACIAL PROFILING
Although the public, .... and the Court have embraced nondis-
crimination as an abstract principle, Plessey showed it was pos-
sible to pay lip service to nondiscrimination while sanctioning
oppression of people.252
Many Supreme Court Justices opposing affirmative action programs
argue that "[i]f laws are of general applicability, [then] no one can be sin-
gled out because of race"; 253 however, those same Justices approve of a law
enforcement tactic called "racial profiling," which does just that by singling
Out people on the basis of race because of the belief that those persons are
more likely to commit a criminal offense. "The problems with racial profil-
ing, known all too well by many, are finally being discussed openly in the
media and other forums. 254 Racial profiling is the controversial practice
used by many law enforcement divisions of establishing specific physical
and cultural or ethnic characteristics to target and apprehend suspects of
criminal activity.25 5 Race is one such "characteristic" used, and with the
approval of the United States Supreme Court.256
252. Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1335. Much of the discussion can be attributed to the
fact that "[g]roups of citizens are now bringing civil suits against police departments for
alleged ... singling out [of] blacks or Hispanic[s] ... for discriminatory enforcement of...
the traffic laws or for random stops without reasonable suspicion to investigate drug-
trafficking." Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justice?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 999, 1008 (2000).
253. Wesley M. Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand Pretextual Stops and
Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1435 (2000).
254. Camille Knight, The Realities of Racial Profiling: Broad Interpretations of High
Court Decisions Lead to Fourth Amendment Abuses, 15 CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (2000). See also
Gail Russell Chaddock, Debate Over Racial Profiling Intensifies on the Hill, Oct. 2, 2001, at
www.csmonitor.com/2001 /1004.p2s2-uspo.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (detailing senate
debates on racial profiling); Bill Dedman, Traffic Citations Reveal Disparity in Police
Searches, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2003, at www.boston.com /dailyglobe2/008/metro
/Taskforce to reviewstate data on traffic-stops (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (detailing
results of metro Boston data collection effort to discover extent of alleged racial profiling);
Bill Dedman, Task Force To Review State Data on Traffic Stops, Jan. 8, 2003, BOSTON
GLOBE, at www.boston.com/dailyglobe2
/008/metro/Task force to reviewstate data on traffic stops (last visited Jan. 22, 2003)
(reporting on task force created in metro Boston area aimed at exploring "the causes of racial
disparities in traffic tickets and vehicle searches").
255. Racial profiling is also described as "any police-initiated action that relies on the
race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that
leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been
engaged in criminal activity." DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL
PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM 3 (U.S. Dept. Justice 2000); see also Peter Siggins,
Racial Profiling in an Age of Terrorism, at www.scu.edu/ethics/publicatons/ethicalperspec-
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"'Driving while black' is a term coined by civil rights advocates to in-
dicate racial profiling of African Americans. But in recent years, 'flying
while Arab' has entered the vocabulary." 257 Described as "the dark side of
America's war on terrorism, ' '258 one news source has reported approxi-
mately 200 incidents of profiling at airports since the attacks in New York
City and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001.259 Moreover, the De-
partment of Justice has proposed new legislation that seeks to increase the
scope and breadth of investigations aimed at targeting America's Arab
communities. 260 The most surprising aspect of this new practice is that it has
apparently found much support among many Americans, even those in the
261
African-American community.
tives/profiling.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (describing racial profiling as "government
activity directed at a suspect or group of suspects because of their race, whether intentional
or because of the disproportionate numbers of contacts based upon other pre-textual rea-
sons"). This "profile is based on a compilation of characteristics derived from research and
experience that serve[s] as a reasonable indication that an individual is involved in criminal
activity." Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 129 n.20 (2000) (quoting John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation,
A.B.A. J. 46 (1999)).
256. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("[iun evaluating the validity
of a stop ... we must consider 'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture' thus,
while race cannot be the only factor in detaining an individual, it can be one of them).
257. Niraj Warikoo, Racial Profiling: Muslims and Arab Americans See Their Civil
Rights Eroded, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 24, 2001, at http://www.freep.comnews/
nw/terror200l/arab24_20011024.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) ("[t]he U.S. government has
locked up hundreds of Arab Muslim men in connection with the terrorism investigation;
some who have been held don't know the charges against them").
258. Thomas Ginsberg, Profiling Charged on Nightmare Flight, PHIL. ENQUIRER, Sept.
19, 2002, at http:///www.philly.comi/mld/inquirer.4102992.htm. (last visited Jan. 22, 2003)
(stating "[i]n our haste to protect ourselves, we are literally turning on each other"). See also
Andrew Gumbel, Fears of Witch-hunt as Police Question Arab Men, Nov. 28, 2001, at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americans/story.jsp?story=107156. (last visited Jan. 22,
2003) (noting that "young Middle Eastern men in the Detroit area were sent letters ... asking
them to set up 'interviews' with the police to relay any information they may have about
terrorism or the terrorist sympathies of friends").
259. Donna Leinwand, Lawsuits Accuse Airlines of Profiling Men Who Appear To Be
Arabs Barred from Flights -ACLU Says, USA TODAY, Jun. 4, 2002, at 10A (describing
lawsuits involving "men who appear to be of Arab descent and who had been cleared
through security but were removed from flights or denied boarding").
260. See Warikoo, supra note 257 (noting that antiterrorism bill "would make it easier
for the government to wiretap and search homes without the owner knowing about it, allow
the CIA to spy on citizens, and broaden the definition of a terrorist").
261. Leela Jacinto, Flying While Arab, Aug. 14, 2002, at http://www.abcnews.go.com
/sections/world/DailyNews/visa02O8l4.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (noting recent Zogby
International poll that found "60 percent of blacks favored a policy that singles out Arab-
Americans for special scrutiny at airport check-in counters"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for
Using Racial Profiling at Airports, Sep. 25, 2001, at http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/nj/taylor200l-09-25.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) ("If you were boarding an air-
plane, wouldn't you want authorities to scrutinize Arab passengers?"); but see Niraj
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Challenges to racial profiling brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "are hampered by the burden of proof
established by the Court., 262 As the law stands, "[t]o prove such a claim, the
plaintiffs must show both disparate impact and discriminatory intent.,
263
Statistics proving disparate impact are readily available and clear.2 64 Despite
this, the relevancy of an officer's discriminatory intent is questionable due
to the Court's decision in Whren v. United States.265 Nevertheless, even a
plaintiff who proves both elements of the claim may lose due to "the gov-
ernment's 'compelling' interest in drug interdiction [which] justifies sub-
verting civil rights. 266 According to the Court, under Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, curtailing drug activity is a compelling governmental
interest justifying the use of race as a factor in profiling. Moreover, it ap-
pears that a majority of the Justices agree that racial profiling is narrowly
Warikoo, Black, Arab-American Leaders Assail Racial Profiling, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 11,
2002, at http://www.freep.com/news/locway/deportl 1_2002011 l.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2003) (reporting that "Arab-American and African-American leaders met ... in Detroit to
denounce what they see as racial profiling against Middle Eastern men by the U.S. govern-
ment"). See also Niraj Warikoo, Race Bias Checked at Metro Airport, DET. FREE PRESS, Jun.
5, 2001, at http://www.freep.com/money/business/narab5 _20010605.htm (last visited Jan.
22, 2003) (reporting that the "U.S. Deptartment of Transportation began surveying passen-
gers at Detroit Metro Airport on Monday in an effort to determine whether racial profiling is
a problem at... airports").
262. Knight, supra note 254, at 24.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (making racial bias irrelevant when there is probable
cause to stop driver, thus the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend
on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved). See also Id. at 24. Therefore,
an officer may only stop minorities for the exact same offense the officer witnesses white
drivers commit. To its credit, the Court did note in Whren that the plaintiff should bring his
claim of racial bias under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). However, the Court failed to recognize
the procedural bars and heavy burdens of proof those plaintiffs face. Moreover, the Court
failed to realize that many discretionary stops by officers with racial biases are merely pre-
text and that barring evidence gathered as a result of such pretextual stops will act as a
greater deterrence to the officer.
Pretext ... must be at least one reason minorities are disproportionately stopped
... [for] a pretextual stop flows from an officer's belief that criminal activity is
afoot despite the absence of articulable suspicion . . . [and] [a] pretextual stop
based on a racial profile stems . . . from a belief that stopping minorities will
yield evidence of crime more often than stopping other motorists ... [thus]
[Il]imiting an officer's power to benefit from evidence he discovers during a pre-
textual stop discourages the use of pretextual stops.
Oliver, supra note 253, at 1414.
266. Knight, supra note 254, at 24. Title VII's standing problems have also hindered
plaintiffs who bring claims under Title VII. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, No. 94-
C5307, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11976 (N.D. I11. Aug. 2, 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show he
will imminently be stopped again in the future to have standing in racial profiling challenge).
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tailored to achieve the objective of drug interdiction. On the other hand,
remedying the present effects of past racism is not a compelling governmen-
tal interest justifying the use of race as a factor in an affirmative action pro-
gram. Furthermore, it is perceived that any affirmative action program using
racial classifications is not narrowly tailored to achieve the objectives of
curing past racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the disparity of the use of race in
affirmative action programs and racial profiling. Research has never shown
that minorities are more likely to be involved in criminal activity. 267 On the
other hand, studies certainly have shown that minorities are more likely to
be victims of racial discrimination, especially in the area of criminal law
enforcement.268 Yet, the use of race in affirmative action schemes is given
267. Nevertheless,
our country has historically associated crime with race, and still does today. Af-
rican-Americans are often viewed as being out of control and as possibly dan-
gerous. There is a commonly held belief that they tend to commit more crime
and thus police are justified in targeting African-Americans as opposed to other
groups. Many feel that the focus of the police should be aimed a preventing
black crime against white victims because of the dangerous nature of African-
Americans.
Jennifer A. Larrabee, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of
an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291, 326 (1997).
268. For example, "a ... study by the Associated Press revealed that African American
drivers are four times as likely to be stopped by police along sections of Interstate 95 in
Maryland than other drivers." Larrabee, supra note 267, at 292-93.
In New Jersey, 75% of drivers stopped for investigation on portions of the New
Jersey Turnpike are African-Americans and Latinos, yet this group only makes
up 13.5% of the annual drivers on the Turnpike. Minority drivers traveling
through the suburbs of Texas' major cities are twice as likely to receive tickets
for traffic violations than are white drivers.. . In one Florida county, 62% of the
drivers stopped were minorities, and on an interstate in Colorado, 190 out of 200
stops "targeted minorities."
Id. at 296-97. In response, "[a] group of citizens are now bringing civil suits against police
departments for alleged 'racial profiling,' that is, singling out blacks or Hispanic Americans
for discriminatory enforcement of' violations of criminal statutes. Thaman, supra note 252,
at 1008. Moreover, "[t]he federal government recently sued the State of New Jersey and the
New Jersey State Police for engaging in a well-documented practice of targeting racial mi-
norities in the enforcement of traffic laws on the New Jersey Turnpike." Oliver, supra note
253, at 1476. Such claims of racial profiling have also resulted in the granting of at least 17
motions to suppress in New Jersey alone. 66 CRIM. L. REP. 251 (2000). See also Larrabee,
supra note 267, at 298 nn. 38-39 (detailing other statistics indicating discrimination against
minorities by state law enforcement agencies, including: a report comparing the stops of
motorists on Interstates 85 and 95 by the State Police Special Emphasis Team, which tar-
geted drug offenses, to stops made by the regular highway patrol showing forty-five percent
of charges rendered by the Special Emphasis Team were against African Americans, whereas
other troopers working the same highways issued only twenty-four percent of their charges
against African-Americans; a report revealing that police use race as a factor in deciding
whom to stop on the highway; and a report "revealing that Sheriff Vogel of Volusia County,
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the highest level of scrutiny allowable, making it almost impossible to use
race as a factor in admissions and employment decisions; conversely, courts
often defer to law enforcement agencies by using the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach when examining allegations of racial profiling. 69
The Court failed to engage in a least intrusive means inquiry to determine if
law enforcement agencies have proof to verify their suspicions, 70 while
adopters of affirmative action programs are more likely than not to see their
programs perish because of this.271 Most disturbing is that the intent of an
employer or university to consider race as an admissions criterion is, for all
intents and purposes, unlawful. Nevertheless, the use of race by a police
officer in determining which vehicles to stop for traffic violations is consid-
ered to be irrelevant. This applies even if the officer had probable cause to
stop several drivers, but intentionally only stopped those drivers against
whom the officer had a racial bias.
Florida instructed his Selective Enforcement team to look for cars in which 'African Ameri-
can and Hispanic motorists were traveling' in the Team's quest for drug busts").
269. By ruling the officer's racial bias irrelevant, the Court in Whren refused to recognize
the abuses of power that law enforcement officers regularly commit, especially when dealing
with minor traffic offenses such as that in Whren. See also Jernigan, supra note 255, at 132
(arguing Whren "leaves too much discretion in the hand of police officers" and noting that
"the Court never addressed the petitioners' concern that relying on probable cause in the
context of pretextual traffic stops leaves motorists without protection against arbitrary law
enforcement").
Given that nearly all motorists commit some traffic offense, even on short trips,
the base-line expectation of an ordinary traffic offender is that his liberty and
privacy will go undisturbed[; this permits] an officer standardless discretion to
determine which of the many traffic offenders to single out, stop, and subject to
the indignity of a request to search [which] runs afoul of an Amendment de-
signed to prevent placing 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer' [and] [a]s the guardians of the people from themselves, the courts must
restrain officers' discretion to determine who shall be seized and searched.
Oliver, supra note 253, at 1412.
270. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989).
271. Should not a university be given the same deference when making admissions deci-
sions? If not, then should the police be allowed to use race as a factor in determining who to
arrest? Is it important to imprison blacks and other minorities than to educate them?
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VI. HOPWOOD & THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN: AWAITING THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION
The reconstruction of society is the promise of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
272
The first Supreme Court case determining the validity of a college or
university's affirmative action program was Regents of University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.27 3 Since Bakke, however, a number of circuit courts have
determined the validity of affirmative action programs in institutions of
higher education. Until recently, the most controversial of these cases was
Hopwood v. Texas.274
In Hopwood, four non-minority applicants who were rejected by the
University of Texas Law School brought a lawsuit challenging the univer-
sity's affirmative action program under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. 275 The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas entered judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the University
of Texas violated plaintiffs' equal protection guarantees.276 The district
court also held that the university's affirmative action program passed strict
scrutiny analysis because there was a compelling governmental interest in
creating diversity at the university's law school and Texas's plan was nar-
rowly tailored to meet these objectives.2 77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded in part.2 78 While the Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs' equal
protection rights were violated and strict scrutiny was the appropriate stan-
dard of review, the circuit court disagreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that the university's affirmative action plan passed muster under the
strict scrutiny analysis. 279 A majority of the Fifth Circuit's panel held that
Bakke's diversity rationale was not controlling, reasoning that "the Court
has accepted the diversity rationale only once in its cases dealing with
race[,] and that case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc., was overruled by Ada-
272. Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Gift of Hopwood: Diversity and the Fife and Drum
March Back to the Nineteenth Century, 34 GA. L. REV. 291, 346 (1999).
273. 438 U.S. 265, 320 (holding that while the University of California's affirmative
action program was invalid and plaintiff was entitled to admission to defendant's medical
school, defendant may use race as one of many factors to determine admission to its medical
school).
274. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
275. Id. at 938.
276. Id. at 938-39.
277. Id. at 941.
278. Id. at 962.
279. Id. at 944.
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rand.2 80 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, the diversity rational was not
a compelling governmental interest, as "[m]odern equal protection has rec-
ognized one compelling state interest: remedying the effects of racial dis-
crimination. 28' Judge Wiener specially concurred and disagreed with the
panel's holding that diversity can never be a compelling governmental in-
terest in an institution of higher learning.
282
As expected, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood came under at-
tack by legal scholars because of the three judge panel's disregard of
Bakke.283 Others applauded Hopwood's clear determination that diversity
was not a compelling governmental interest. 284 Because the Fifth Circuit
denied en banc review of Hopwood2 85 and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari,286 it was unclear whether the three judge panel was incor-
rect in disregarding Bakke and concluding that the diversity was not a com-
pelling governmental interest justifying a racial classification by institutions
of higher education.
Since Hopwood, other federal courts of appeal have faced determining
the validity of the diversity rational in reversed discrimination claims.
2 87
280. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45 (stating "[i]n short, there has long been no indication
from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's
interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for governmental race-based dis-
crimination ... [and s]ubsequent Supreme Court case law strongly suggests, in fact, that it is
not").
281. Id. at 944-46 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497
U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (stating "we see the case
law sufficiently established that the use of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heteroge-
neity, even as part of the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional")).
282. Id. at 962 (Weiner, J., concurring).
I respectfully disagree with the panel opinion's conclusion that diversity can
never be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate school[,] ...
[r]ather... I would assume arguendo that diversity can be a compelling interest
but conclude that the admissions process here under scrutiny was not narrowly
tailored to achieve diversity.
Id.
283. Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in the
Education Area, 42 How. L.J. 451, 467 (1999) (arguing that Hopwood and its progeny have
had a chilling effect and have weakened affirmative action programs).
284. See Sullivan, supra note 272, at 292-93, 296 (describing the diversity rationale as
"the amorphous concept presented in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, [which]
provides weak, inappropriate, and ultimately mutable doctrinal support for race-conscious
remedies" and arguing that the "'substanceless definition of diversity undermines what ought
to be affirmative action's true purpose[,] ... the remedying of society's racism") (quoting
Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L.
REV. 757, 765-69 (1997)).
285. Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996).
286. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
287. See Brewer v. West lrondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2nd Cir. 2000);
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999); Hunter v. Re-
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One case seems to have accepted the reasoning of Hopwood by concluding
that the diversity rationale was invalid.2 8 Other cases declined to determine
the issue and instead examined whether there was a compelling governmen-
tal interest or whether the program was narrowly tailored to meet the stated
governmental interest.2 89 This left the Sixth Circuit with conflicting federal
case law 2 90 and virtually no precedent to follow in deciding challenges to
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d
790 (1st Cir. 1998); Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir.
1998); and McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998).
288. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 354-55 (rejecting EEOC com-
mission rationale to "foster 'diverse' programming content" and reasoning that "the sort of
diversity at stake in this case has even less force than the 'important' interest at stake in
Metro Broadcasting").
289. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 749 (stating "this Circuit has not previously taken the posi-
tion that diversity, or other non-remedial state interests, can never be compelling in the edu-
cational setting ... [i]n fact, binding precedent in this Circuit ... explicitly establishes that
reducing defacto segregation ... serves a compelling government interest"); Eisenberg, 197
F.3d at 133-34 ("[w]e have not decided that diversity, as the term is used here, either is or is
not a compelling governmental interest" yet, racial balancing previously held by the circuit
court to be insufficient as a compelling governmental interest and the school's rationale for
denying the student's request to transfer on the basis that it would affect the school's diver-
sity profile because the narrowly tailored prong of the court's analysis was not satisfied);
Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1066-67 (not expressly discussing or rejecting Hopwood, but accepting
that "California has a compelling interest in providing effective education to its diverse,
multi-ethnic, public school population" as a rationale for use of race in admissions process in
order "to obtain the desired student population").
It may be that the Hopwood panel is correct and that, were the Court to address
the question today, it would hold that diversity is not a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify a race-based classification ... [i]t has not done so yet, how-
ever, and we are not prepared to make such a declaration in the absence of a
clear signal that we should ... [for] as matters turn out, we need not definitively
resolve this conundrum today . . . [and] we assume arguendo-but we do not
decide-that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of 'diversity'
might be sufficiently compelling . . . to justify race-conscious actions ..
[therefore] we turn to ... [the school's] alternative justification.
Wessman, 160 F.3d at 796. See also McNamara, 138 F.3d at 1222 (stating "whether other
justifications [besides remedying past discrimination] are possible is unsettled," yet because
no other rationale was offered, the court concluded "the only available justification is the
remedial one").
290. In addition to federal courts, a Nevada state court, as well as state legislatures in
Washington and California, have banned the use of race as a factor in making admissions or
employment decisions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234,
1254 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's undergraduate admissions
policy on ground that it was not narrowly tailored); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233
F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that educational diversity is a compelling govern-
mental interest meeting the demands of strict scrutiny); Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Farmer,
930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997) (upholding university's -minority bonus policy,' which allowed a
department to hire an additional faculty member following the initial placement of a minority
candidate[,]" implemented in response to low number of minority faculty). See also CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31 ([also know as Proposition 209] prohibiting use of race and gender in
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the admissions practice of the University of Michigan's undergraduate and
law schools.29'
In December of 1997, Barbara Grutter, an unsuccessful applicant to the
University of Michigan Law School (the "Law School"), and Jennifer
Gratz, an unsuccessful applicant to the University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science & the Arts (the "University"), brought separate actions
challenging the admissions processes, which, among other factors, consid-
ered the race and/or ethnicity of the applicant.292 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in both cases ruled that the ad-
missions processes for certain years was unlawful.293 The unsuccessful par-
admissions and employment decisions made by the "state or local governments in the areas
of public employment, contracting, and education that gives 'preferential treatment' on the
basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49:60
(West 1999) (prohibiting the state, which includes the state itself, any city, county, public or
community college or university, school district, special district or other political subdivision
or governmental instrumentality of or within the state, "from discriminating against or grant-
ing preferential treatment to individuals or groups based on race, sex, color, ethnicity or
national origin"); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacat-
ing preliminary injunction against enforcement of Proposition 209).
291. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2411
(2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003). In both cases, non-minority students brought actions under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Title VI seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claiming violations
of their constitutional rights by the University of Michigan's undergraduate and law school
admissions policy. Id. The University of Michigan defended its program on the basis of
diversity, among other things. See Thomas D. Russell, The Shape of the Michigan River as
Viewed from the Land of Sweatt v. Painter and Hopwood, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 507, 510,
514 (discussing study done by University of Michigan researchers showing that "law stu-
dents value diversity as an aspect of their educational experience"). See also Smith, 2 F.
Supp. 2d at 1330 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (discussing claim against University of Washington
Law School claiming university uses race as a dispositive factor, not a plus, in making ad-
missions decisions).
292. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8677 (Dec. 2,
2002) & Brief for Petitioner at 9, Gratz v. Bollinger (Dec. 2, 2002). Both cases were later
certified by the district court as class actions. Id.
293. In Gntter, the district court, following cross motions for summary judgment and a
trial on the merits, ruled as a matter of law that "the [L]aw School's stated interest in achiev-
ing diversity in the student body was not a compelling interest that could justify racial pref-
erences in admissions." Brief for Petitioner at 14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
8677 (Dec. 2, 2002). Moreover, the district court held that "even if diversity was compelling,
the Law School's racial preferences were not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Id.
The district court in Gratz "granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to
declaring the University's admissions system for years 1995-1998 unlawful." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 9, Gratz v. Bollinger (Dec. 2, 2002). With respect to the constitutionality of the
University's admissions program for years 1999-2000, the district court granted summary
judgment in the University's favor. Id.
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ties in both cases appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.294
The en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in
part the trial court's ruling with regards to the Law School admissions pro-
gram.295 Writing for the majority, Chief Circuit Judge Martin reasoned that
under Marks v. United States,296 Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke297 was
binding on the court298 and thus, the Law School had a compelling interest
in achieving a diverse student body.299 Moreover, the court held that the
"Law School's competitive consideration of the race and ethnicity of Afri-
can-Americans, Hispanics[,] and Native Americans closely tracts the Har-
vard plan." 300 Circuit Judge Clay, concurring, agreed that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke remained the "law of the land," that the evidence sup-
ported "diversity as a compelling governmental interest," and that the law
school's policy was "narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of
diversity."
30'
Circuit Judge Boggs dissented and argued that the Law School's ad-
missions policy was a "straightforward instance of racial discrimination by
a state institution., 30 2 Arguing that the majority's application of Marks to
Bakke was in error, Circuit Judge Boggs reasoned that "the separate opin-
ions in Bakke do not constitute a coherent set and subset of each other and
cannot be placed in a logical continuum." 303 Even if Marks could be applied
to Bakke, however, "the rationales for the use of race put forth by the Bakke
concurrences [are] not a continuum, but ... several distinct and unrelated
294. Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8677 (Dec. 2,
2002) & Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Gratz v. Bollinger (Dec. 2, 2002).
295. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002) aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003). The Court of Appeals heard argument in Gratz and stated that a decision would be
rendered. Id. at 735 n.2. However, no opinion was issued. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Gratz v.
Bollinger (Dec. 2, 2002).
296. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.").
297. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 269-320 (1978).
298. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 738-744. In so ruling, the majority reasoned that because Jus-
tice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke applied strict scrutiny to the use of a racial factor,
rather than intermediate scrutiny applied by the four concurring Justices, Adarand did not
implicitly overrule Bakke. Id. at 741-45. Therefore, Powell's opinion provided the narrowest
rationale for Bakke's holding under Marks. Id. As a result, "Bakke remains the law until the
Supreme Court instructs otherwise." Id. at 739.
299. Id. at 742.
300. Id. at 746.
301. Id. at 758-73 (Clay, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 773 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 781 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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justifications. ' 3°  In any event, argued Circuit Judge Boggs, the Law
School's admissions policy, which purportedly sought a diverse student
body, lacked substance and was not narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est. 30 5 Circuit Judge Gilman also dissented and argued that assuming educa-
tional diversity is a compelling interest, the Law School's use of a critical
mass of minority students was indistinguishable from a quota.3 °6 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in both cases.30 7
VII. THE COURT'S DECISION(S)
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter and joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the educational
benefits attained from a diverse student body is a compelling governmental
308interest justifying the use of race in university admissions. To reach this
conclusion, the Grutter Court relied not only upon the University's judg-
ment that diversity is essential to its educational mission, but also
the [numerous] expert studies and reports... show[ing] that... diver-
sity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an in-
creasingly diverse workforce'. . . . [A]s major American businesses have
made clear[,] . . . the skills needed in today's increasingly global mar-
ketplace can only be developed through exposure to... diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."
309
The Grutter majority also agreed that the law school's use of race was
narrowly tailored to meet those goals. 310 These Justices reasoned that, unlike
a quota, the law school's attainment of a critical mass of underrepresented
304. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 783 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 795-96 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 816-17 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
307. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002); Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044
(2002).
308. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (5-4 decision). In so holding, the Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is binding prece-
dent under Marks, as that inquiry has "baffled and divided the lower courts that have consid-
ered it." Id. at 2337. Instead, the Court itself endorsed Justice Powell's diversity rationale. Id.
309. Id. at 2340 (citations omitted). The Court was most persuaded by amici of highly
ranked U.S. military retirees and civilian leaders who argued that
a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security." . . . At pre-
sent, "the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified
and racially diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited
race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies."
Id. (citations omitted).
310. Id. at 2341-42. The Court reasoned that the Law School's admissions program uses
race in a "flexible, nonmechanical way." Id. at 2342.
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minority students is not a fixed number or proportion of opportunities re-
served exclusively for certain minority groups.31' Moreover, "the Law
School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each appli-
cant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment... [and] all factors that may
contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside
race in admissions decisions. 31 2 The Court warned, however, "25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to fur-
ther the interest approved today. 31 3
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the
Court's "Grutter-Gratz split double header" will, without a doubt, cause a
flood of controversy and litigation.314 Justice Scalia contends that "a clear
constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions
are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial pref-
erences in state educational institutions are OK," most likely could have
prevented such a result. 31 5 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, also
dissented separately, but agreed that "racial discrimination in higher educa-
tion admissions will be illegal in 25 years. 31 6 However, according to Jus-
tice Thomas, "the Law School's use of race violates that Equal Protection
Clause and ... the Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300
months."
31 7
311. Id. at 2342. The Court distinguishes a quota as a "program in which a certain fixed
number or proportion of opportunities are 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups[,]
... which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded,' ... and 'insulate[s] the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats."' Id. (citations omitted). A
permissible goal, on the other hand, "'requires only a good-faith effort ... to come within a
range demarcated by the goal itself ... and permits consideration of race as a 'plus' factor in
any given case while still ensuring that each candidate 'competes with all other qualified
applicants."' Id. (citations omitted).
312. 1d. at 2343-44.
313. Id. at 2347. Concurring separately, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, noted
that "[f]rom today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next
generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will
make it safe to sunset affirmative action." Id. at 2348 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
314. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia contended that
future lawsuits will likely focus on whether affirmative action programs sufficiently focus on
the individual or whether the university has put forth a good faith effort to avoid a quota. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Other lawsuits will focus on whether there are educational benefits of
the diversity scheme or whether the university's "racial preferences have gone below or
above the mystical Grutter-approved 'critical mass."' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3i7. id. at 2351 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that while "blacks [and
other minorities] can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of
university administrators, . . . [t]he Law School, of its own choosing, and for its own pur-
poses, maintains an exclusionary admissions system that it knows produces racially dispro-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist also dissented and was joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 318 These dissenters argued that the law
school's "means ... [were not] narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts[:]
'critical mass."' 319 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, this is evidenced
by the fact that significantly more individuals from one underrepresented
minority group than the others are needed in order to achieve "critical mass"
or further student body diversity. 32 Finally, Justice Kennedy argued in a
separate dissent that the majority too willingly relied upon the law school's
representations that its admissions process meets with constitutional re-
quirements.32'
In contrast, the Court held in Gratz that the University's admissions
program was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of
diversity. 322 Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court and
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, found
issue with the University's automatic award of twenty points to "underrep-
resented minorities," as this virtually guaranteed their admission into the
323University. According to the Gratz majority, this practice did not provide
the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Bakke, as
portionate results." Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also maintained that
"Michigan has no compelling interest in having a law school at all, much less an elite one."
Id. at 2354. Noting that only twenty-seven percent of the Law School's student body are
from Michigan and that only six percent of Michigan graduates apply for that state's bar
examination, Justice Thomas contended that the decision to maintain an elite institution
"does little to advance the welfare of the people of Michigan or any other cognizable interest
of the State of Michigan." Id. at 2355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
319. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissenting Justices, the Law
School's admissions program, "[s]tripped of its 'critical mass' veil," can be described as "a
naked effort to achieve racial balancing." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
320. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2366-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
points to the fact that from 1995-2000, the law school admitted between thirteen and nine-
teen Native Americans, between ninety-one and 108 African-Americans, and forty-seven and
fifty-six Hispanics. Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned that if the law school needed to admit a certain number of Afican-American students
to achieve that critical mass, then why aren't the same number of Hispanic and Native
American students also needed to achieve "critical mass" for those underrepresented groups.
Id. at 2366-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "[O]ne would think that a number of the same
order of magnitude [of Hispanic and Native American students as there are of African-
American students] would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and
Native Americans." Id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In doing so, argues Justice Kennedy, "[t]he
majority fails to confront the reality of how the Law School's admissions policy is imple-
mented." Id.
322. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (6-3 decision). As a preliminary matter,
the Court first ruled that the Gratz petitioners had standing to bring forth their claims. Id. at
2422-2425.
323. Id. at 2427-29.
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"'the factor of race . . .[became] decisive' for virtually every minimally
qualified underrepresented minority applicant." 324 The fact that the Univer-
sity provided some level of individualized review was inconsequential, as
such individualized review only occurred after a candidate for admissions
was automatically awarded the twenty points.325 As a result, the Univer-
sity's undergraduate program was found to be unconstitutional.326
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Jus-
tice Breyer, agreed that this twenty-point bonus was not the type of indi-
vidualized consideration endorsed by Justice Powell.327 Justice Thomas also
concurred separately and argued that the University's policy fails "because
it does not sufficiently allow for the consideration of nonracial distinctions
among underrepresented minority applicants. 328 Justice Breyer concurred
separately in the Court's judgment of liability on the University, but empha-
sized that he did not join in the Court's opinion. 329 Instead, Justice Breyer
argued that "in implementing the Constitution's equality instruction, gov-
ernment decision makers [sic] may properly distinguish between policies of
inclusion and exclusion, for the former are more likely to prove consistent
with the basic constitutional obligation that the law respect each individual
equally."
330
324. Id. at 2428 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[t]he only
consideration that accompanies ...[the University's] distribution of [the 20] points is a
factual review of an application to determine whether an individual is a member of one of
these minority groups." Id. As a result, each particular candidate was not considered indi-
vidually by an assessment and evaluation of their abilities to contribute to the unique setting
of higher education. Id. at 2429.
325. Id. at 2430.
326. Id. Because this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it also violated Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. As a result, the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University on the issue of liability was
reversed and the case remanded. Id. at 2430-3 1.
327. Id. at 2431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Unlike the [L]aw [S]chool that considers
the various diversity qualifications of each applicant, including race, on a case-by-case ba-
sis," argued Justice O'Connor, the University's undergraduate admissions program "relies on
the selection index to assign every underrepresented minority applicant the same, automatic
20-point bonus without consideration of the particular background, experiences, or qualities
of each individual applicant." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). This "nonindividualized, me-
chanical" approach "automatically determines the admissions decisions for each [nonminor-
ity] applicant." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). In short, Justice O'Connor believed that 20
points was simply too much. See id. at 2432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "[e]ven the
most outstanding national high school leader could never receive more than five points for
his or her accomplishments-a mere quarter of the points automatically assigned to an un-
derrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her race").
328. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring).
329. Id. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring).
330. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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In dissent, Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice Souter, argued
that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, as "[n]either petitioner has
a personal stake in the outcome of the case, and neither has standing to seek
prospective relief on behalf of unidentified class members who may or may
not have standing to litigate on behalf of themselves." 331 Justice Souter also
dissented separately and argued that the University's admissions program
"is closer to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke condemns, and
should not be held unconstitutional on the current record. 3 32 Justice Gins-




It is... undeniable that the search for truth often causes pain.
334
Even after Grutter-Gratz's "split double header," reverse discrimina-
tion jurisprudence remains a complex area. However, some conclusions can
be made.
First, plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VI or VII of the Civil
Rights Act will have the burden of isolating and identifying the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statis-
tical disparities.335 Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie disparate
impact case, the employer bears the burden of producing evidence of a
business justification for its employment practices. 336 Nevertheless, the bur-
den of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.
337
331. Id. at 2434-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 2440 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer reasoned that because the Univer-
sity's admissions practice "lets all applicants compete for all places, ... a nonminority appli-
cant who scores highly on these other categories can readily gamer a selection index exceed-
ing that of a minority applicant who gets the 20-point bonus." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Thus, "[iln the Court's own words, 'each characteristic of a particular applicant [is] consid-
ered in assessing the applicant's entire application."' Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, it
is impossible "to say that the 20 points convert race into a decisive factor comparable to
reserving minority places as in Bakke." Id. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 2445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was further convinced by the
fact that even though the "stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our soci-
ety," it was undisputed that "[e]very applicant admitted under the current plan ...[wa]s
qualified to attend the College." Id. at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
334. Kennedy, supra note 217, at 1340.
335. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. 642, 656-61 (1989).
336. Id. Moreover, racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to the selection of
workers for the employer's other positions. Id. at 656-58.
337. Id. at 656-61.
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Second, whether the claim is brought under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment, strict scrutiny will apply to any program making classifica-
tions based on race.338 While the Court warns that strict scrutiny is not "fatal
in fact," few programs have survived since the adoption of this standard.
339
Before Grutter, the only compelling governmental interest justifying the use
of racial classifications was remedying the effects of past discrimination
upon individuals who have experienced discrimination by the particular
entity adopting the affirmative action program.340 However, Grutter makes
it abundantly clear that the educational benefits of a diverse student body
also serve a compelling governmental interest justifying the use of a racial
classification in admissions programs of a college or university. 341 Never-
theless, the question of the meaning of Bakke and more importantly, what
distinguishes a quota from "critical mass" remains a mystery.
This was demonstrated during the oral argument of Maureen Mohoney,
on behalf of the Law School, when she discussed 44 F.R. 58510, which was
issued by the Department of Education after Bakke.342 This policy interpre-
tation specifically authorized the use of race in admissions decisions as long
as they did not set aside a fixed number of places or make race the sole cri-
terion for eligibility. 343 According to Ms. Mahoney's interpretation of
Bakke, there must be more than a token number of minorities in order to
achieve the educational benefits of diversity.344 However, when answering
the question of what constitutes a quota, Ms. Mahoney replied, "what a
quota is under this Court's cases is a fixed number., 345 If a quota'is a fixed
number, how does one determine what constitutes more than a token num-
338. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-31, 235-39 (1995) (de-
claring strict scrutiny applies to federal affirmative action programs based on race); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-528 (1989) (declaring strict scrutiny the
appropriate standard for state affirmative action program based on race).
339. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (striking down University of Michi-
gan's undergraduate admissions program on grounds that it was not narrowly tailored to
serve compelling governmental interest of racial diversity); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200 (strik-
ing down affirmative action program under strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993) (striking down voting district plan based on race); J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469 (de-
claring strict scrutiny appropriate standard for affirmative action program based on race and
striking down program).
340. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-28. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476
U.S. 267, 269-95 (1986), made clear that the role model rational is insufficient. So is reme-
dying the present effects of past discrimination. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-528.
341. See supra notes 308-21 and accompanying text (discussing Grutter). See also supra
notes 273-307 and accompanying text (discussing split in federal and state courts regarding
force of Bakke and whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest).
342. Transcript of Oral Argument, Grutter v. Boilinger, at 37.
343. 44 Fed. Reg. 58510 (1979).
344. Transcript of Oral Argument, Grutter v. Bollinger, at 38.
345. Id. at 40
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ber sufficient to meet the demands of diversity? The Court utterly failed to
resolve or offer any guidance on this issue.
Perhaps a state may find it easier to adopt admissions programs that are
race neutral, as did Texas and California. The benefit of such programs is
that they not only encompass those targeted by traditional affirmative action
programs, they also target those negatively affected by those same pro-
grams.346 For example, Texas' "ten percent plan," which was adopted in the
wake of Hopwood,
requires the University of Texas to admit the top ten percent of every
high school's graduating class in the State of Texas. While the criterion
for admission under this plan is race neutral, many agree that more Afri-
can- and Mexican-American students have been admitted to the Univer-
sity than the affirmative action program that was outlawed in Hop-
wood.
347
However, not all agree that these programs have resulted in a sufficient
number of minority students to adequately promote diversity.348 This can be
attributed to the fact that most minority students gaining admission under
these programs are not as well prepared as their Caucasian counterparts.
This is most likely a result of unequal standards of education between inner
city public schools, which are predominately attended by poor Americans of
African and Hispanic descent, and private schools or suburban public
schools, which are almost exclusively attended by the nation's upper to
middle class, who most likely are Caucasian.349
"[T]he legacy of legally-enforced slavery, Jim Crow legislation, and
privately-held racial prejudice has produced a society in which African-
Americans [as well as other minorities] as a group have a lower socio-
economic status and less political and economic power than Caucasians.
'" 350
346. But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Selective Admissions, 100 Mice. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2002) (explaining that the "perceived
unfairness" of affirmative action programs "is more exaggerated than real" and that while
"minority applicants stand a much better chance of gaining admission to selective institutions
with the existence of affirmative action ... [there is] no logical basis to infer that white ap-
plicants would stand a much better chance of admission in the absence of affirmative ac-
tion").
347. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 969 (2001).
348. Transcript of Oral Argument, Grutter v. Bollinger, at 38.
349. See Hasnas, supra note 3.
350. Id. at 438. See also Freeman, supra note 215, at 359-60. Professor Freeman notes
that:
there was always some more important issue which turned national attention
elsewhere. It was more important, for example, to have a ratified Constitution
even if it accepted the legitimacy of slavery, than to have had the sectional strife
that might have meant no Constitution. It was more important to respect property
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Furthermore, "[n]otwithstanding Brown, 3 5 1 racial segregation in the schools
has been increasing in almost every state, even during the 1990s."' 352 As
funding for public educatioh has become based on the property value of the
particular community rather than the needs of the students, 353 more and
more public schools located in poor areas have fewer resources than public
schools located in more affluent areas.
This uneven spread of economic and social wealth has resulted in Afri-
can-Americans and other minorities remaining disproportionately disadvan-
taged. Without a doubt, "[m]ost of what are regarded as the decisive charac-
teristics for higher education or employment have a great deal to do with
things over which the individual has neither control nor responsibility[,]"
most particularly, the socioeconomic class of their parents. 354 It cannot be
disputed that for the most part, education remains the key to success in
America. Despite this truth, the Supreme Court has refused to make educa-
tion a fundamental right.355
rights than to distribute land and power on an equitable basis to those freed from
slavery by the Civil War. And it was more important to ignore altogether the
plight of the newly freed in order to get on with the "business" of industrializing
America. In the twentieth century, fighting the Great Depression meant ignoring,
and then barely noticing, the plight of black Americans, lest powerful Southern
members of Congress be offended. Waging World War II was so important we
could not risk the moral problems that might result from desegregating the army.
We had to move slowly also in the late 1950's, lest we upset the established
"Southern way of life." In the 1970's when school desegregation finally threat-
ened the enclaves of white suburbia, the paramount value became the 'local
autonomy' of the suburbs.
ld.
351. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (denouncing "separate but
equal" and declaring intentional segregation in public school unlawful).
352. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2002).
353. See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983)
(describing the phenomena of white flight which made it possible for such schemes to be
implemented); Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools Under State Constitu-
tional Law, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 279 (1999) (discussing public school financing in
state constitutional law).
354. See Hasnas, supra note 3, at 497 (arguing that "individuals [do not] morally deserve
their qualifications and abilities since these arise largely as a matter of chance or as a result
of past societal inequities"). See also Anderson, supra note 352, at 1203 (noting that "among
all privately owned U.S. businesses, half were started by their owners; the other half were
inherited or purchased[, b]y contrast, ninety-four percent of black-owned businesses are self-
started"); Kristen Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter, Rethinking Admission to the Le-
gal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1700 (2002) (noting recent study finding that the
SAT is a "socially constructed rather than scientifically objective measure of aptitude");
Lawrence, supra note 347, at 945 (arguing that "the SAT does a better job predicting the
socio-economic status of the test taker's parents than predicting college performance").
355. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973) (holding
education is not a fundamental right).
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Not surprisingly, these results reflect our collective inability to resolve
the inadequacies of both the group and individual approaches to rights,
"which represents a clash over views about the nature of ordered society." 356
As demonstrated by arguments on both sides of the debate, adopting an in-
dividual approach to rights "ignores the individual['s] interest deriving from
group affiliation. 357 This is especially true when discrimination against the
individual is based on that individual's affiliation with a certain group.
Adopting a group approach to rights, however, may lead to an overly broad
extension of benefits, which may result in the granting of benefits to those
who may not need it and, in turn, denying benefits to those in need. It must
be recognized that the rights of each individual are based on both the group
of which he is a member and his status as an individual in society. It is only
then that a discussion on race in America can lead to results that will ade-
quately answer the questions of affirmative action, reverse discrimination,
and Equal Protection.
356. Clinton, supra note 221, at 743. See also Landsberg, supra note 1, at 1305
("[d]iscrimination is group based, yet it falls on individuals"); Douglas D. Scherer, Affirma-
tive Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of Croson, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 281, 330-
31 (1990) (citation omitted) (stating "[tlhe abstract principle of individual rights under the
equal protection clause is appealing, but will deprive individuals of equality if applied to a
society in which group considerations determine allocation of opportunity"); Wendy B.
Scott, Transformative Desegregation: Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 315, 359 (1999) (quoting ANTHONY E. COOK, THE LEAST OF THESE: RACE, LAW, AND
RELIGION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1997)) (stating "one cannot affirm the individual without
affirming the group with which the group strongly identifies").
357. Rosenfeld, supra note 223, at 260.
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